Navy SEALS - Crossing Cultures: Cross-Cultural Competence and Decision Styles by Newson, Robert
University of San Diego 
Digital USD 
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 
2020-05-20 
Navy SEALS - Crossing Cultures: Cross-Cultural Competence and 
Decision Styles 
Robert Newson 
University of San Diego 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/dissertations 
 Part of the Leadership Studies Commons, and the Other Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Digital USD Citation 
Newson, Robert, "Navy SEALS - Crossing Cultures: Cross-Cultural Competence and Decision Styles" 
(2020). Dissertations. 177. 
https://digital.sandiego.edu/dissertations/177 
This Dissertation: Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at 
Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital USD. For 









NAVY SEALS – CROSSING CULTURES: 




Robert A. Newson 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
 the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
May 2020 
Dissertation Committee 
Fred J. Galloway, EdD, Chair 
George Reed, PhD 
Eric Potterat, PhD 































© Copyright by 
Robert A. Newson 








DATE: January 9, 2020  
 
 
University of San Diego 









TITLE OF DISSERTATION: NAVY SEALs – Crossing Cultures: Cross-Cultural 













Fred J. Galloway, EdD – 
 
_____________________________________, Member 
George Reed, PhD- 
 
_____________________________________, Member 







U.S. military cross-cultural competence is currently deficient, as Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) personnel assessments fail to explicitly consider aspects related to cross-
cultural competence and lack processes specifically tailored to cross-cultural personnel 
assignments. Researchers, however, have identified eleven attributes that contribute to 
military cross-cultural competence; this study uses these attributes to explore whether 
decision styles and demographics correlate with cross-cultural competence. Building on 
existing work on the attributes of military cross-cultural competence (defined in this 
study as the ability to quickly and accurately assess, then effectively act, in a culturally 
complex environment to achieve mission results), I first examined the attribute profiles of 
experienced Navy Sea, Air, and Land Forces (SEALs) to distinguish between cross-
cultural superior and substandard scorers. Logistic regression analysis was then used to 
estimate relationships between several demographic and decision-style factors and 
individual scores in cross-cultural competence. The analysis concluded with a 
comparison of attribute profiles of experienced and newly minted SEALs. Throughout 
the analyses, all statistical testing was done at the 5% level of significance or stronger. 
Although 7.5% of the entire active SEAL community participated in the research 
(n = 253), the empirical results are suggestive but far from conclusive. For example, 
results revealed statistically significant correlations among the 11 factors associated with 
cross-cultural competence and decision-style factors (especially the need for cognition) 
and two demographic traits. Based on the attribute profiles of superior and substandard 
scorers, it appears SEALs have registered strong cross-cultural competence baselines. 
Furthermore, mean scores for the entire SEAL population in the study revealed a strong 
 
 
cognitive style attribute profile from a cross-cultural competence perspective. Additional 
analysis indicated newly minted SEALs, especially those with high scores in need for 
cognition, may be better positioned than the average experienced SEAL to perform well 
when engaging with foreign partners.  
Although this is the first study that assesses a decision-style model for correlation 
with cross-cultural competence (and more research is needed), it suggests decision styles 
may be a useful tool for selection, assessment, and assignment of military personnel who 
deal extensively across cultures (e.g., Army Green Berets, Foreign Area Officers, and 
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When roused to energy, they may be induced to act, but, with pompous 
promises and grandiloquent phrases, postponement and the fear of troubling, 
their lazy intellects predominated. It was always manana, but never today 
with them. To put off everything seemed looked upon as the acme of all that 
was clever, and never to do that which another could do for them was the 
perfection of dexterity. Their whole mind, in short, seemed bent upon doing 
nothing and—they did it. (Esdaile, 2007, p. 161)  
 
This epigraph is from a British officer complaining about his Spaniard partners during the 
Napoleonic Wars. It was humorous to my Special Operations teammates and me that this 
description from the 1800s appeared so appropriate for our current partners in Yemen, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan. However, Esdaile (2007) highlighted in memoir after memoir 
from the Napoleonic Wars the “tremendous prejudice” (p. 161) of British service 
members toward all foreigners. Perhaps the issue, here and now, does not solely lie with 
foreign partners but also with U.S. military members’ abilities to interact and partner 
across cultures.  
In this study, I focused on U.S. Navy Sea, Air, and Land Forces (SEALs) 
operating in a cross-cultural environment. The word SEAL is both an acronym for SEa, 
Air, and Land (a descriptor of the operational environment in which SEALs work) and a 
noun, the name of U.S. naval commandoes. In a 2012 visit to Afghanistan, the U.S. 
Department of State political advisor assigned to the Naval Special Warfare Command, 
headquarters to all U.S. Navy SEALs, received an unexpected answer to a question she 
asked a senior SEAL leader (J. Patterson, personal communication, 2013). She asked the 
second highest ranking officer of a deployed SEAL team why his team was not 





very recent murder of several small children perpetrated through an improvised explosive 
device planted by the Taliban. The SEAL leader responded that doing so would not be 
effective because “these people don’t care about their children.” 
The political advisor asked him to explain. A local man, the SEAL Lieutenant 
Commander said, brought two of the victims—his children—to the nearby U.S. military 
hospital. His children died on the operating table, and the man did not shed a tear; he was 
emotionless about his loss as he walked from the hospital. The political advisor, a 
midgrade foreign service officer and a Pashtu speaker with significant experience in 
Afghanistan, was taken aback. She explained to the SEAL officer that refusing to express 
grief in public does not indicate an absence of grief. Pashtun men do not show emotion in 
public—it would bring them dishonor and shame (J. Patterson, personal communication, 
2013). 
This story is one vignette that underscores a recognized shortfall in cultural 
awareness and cross-cultural competence in the U.S. military (Bezhan, 2012; McFate, 
2005a). This story highlights a lack of specific and localized cultural knowledge, the 
most readily apparent cross-cultural shortfall. However, in the literature review (Chapter 
2), I will show language and culture-specific information—and the related education and 
training—are only two factors in the multifaceted nature of cross-cultural performance.  
The genesis of this study springs from personal experience and an acknowledged 
need (U.S. Special Operations Command [USSOCOM], 2012a, 2012b) to improve U.S. 
Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) capacity in “managing [intercultural] interaction in 
ways that are likely to produce more appropriate and effective individual, relational, 





a SEAL deployed to Kenya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen provided the personal 
motivation for this research. The requirement for cross-cultural competence in SOF 
provides the justification and significance for this research. 
Background to the Study 
From the broadest perspective, beyond the military application, there are 
increasing opportunities to interact and work across cultures (Chhoakar, Brodback, & 
House, 2007; Deardorff, 2006; Earley & Ang, 2003; Earley & Gibson, 2002; Hofstede, 
Hofstede, & Minkoff, 2010; House, Dorfman, Javidan, Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2014; 
House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfan, & Gupta, 2004; Walker & Mansour, 2013). This 
increased opportunity to interact across cultures is driven by an increasingly diverse 
workforce at home, global commerce, networked or partnered organizations, global 
immigration, and international travel. Earley, Ang, and Tan (2006) underscored the 
pressing need for cross-cultural competence in all fields: 
It is urgent to build individual and organizational capacity to meet the social, 
relational, and communication needs thrown up by globalization. Among the 
twenty-first century skills frequently talked about are the ability to adapt 
constantly to different people from diverse cultures and the ability to manage the 
interconnectedness of today’s world. Interactions in the global workplace require 
individuals to be sensitive to different cultures, capable of analyzing them as they 
are encountered, identify what is required of people from other cultures, and 
engaging in appropriate interactions with them. (p. 2) 
 
While expanding in scope and pace in recent years, cross-cultural interaction is 
not a new phenomenon. Cross-cultural engagement has a conceptual foundation that has 
been established across 60 years of scholarly effort (Allport, 1954; Benson, 1978; 
Ezekiel, 1968; Harris, 1977; Smith, 1966; Smith, Fawcett, Ezekiel, & Roth, 1963; 





 Beyond the original research contexts of business, education, and civil-
government relations, cross-cultural competence is particularly important in the military 
context. For more than 18 years, the United States has been engaged in combat 
operations, with notable shortfalls that moved senior leaders to prioritize a focus on 
cross-cultural competence. According to Ross, Thornson, McDonald, and Arrastia 
(2010):  
Instances of stereotyping, racism, and abuse of power by military personnel have 
further showcased the ways in which military members have alienated the local 
populations. For these reasons, the Department of Defense has recently made the 
assessment and training of cross-cultural competence a top priority for the 
military. (p. 1) 
 
Military operations for extended periods in other countries place a high premium 
on successful cross-cultural interaction. Cross-cultural competence, therefore, is a matter 
of significant importance to the military. Relating to and engaging foreign allies and 
partners, understanding the issues important to the local populace, mitigating negative 
consequences of military operations in their neighborhoods (Finney, 2008), and 
understanding the motivations and priorities of the enemy are facilitated with some 
degree of cross-cultural insight and competence (Langewiesche, 2004; Lucas, 2009; 
Putman, 2004; Rubinstein, Fosher, & Fujimuru, 2013; Selmeski, 2007).  
Outside of defined theaters of war, the military requirement for cross-cultural 
competence is just as significant. Special Operations Forces work with partner forces in 
more than 149 countries around the world (Toft, 2018). These deployed forces coordinate 
closely with and follow the lead of the U.S. ambassador and the interagency country team 
in each embassy. As a result, the military crosses national and ethnic cultures in dealing 





Each embassy has its own organizational culture, and each of the agencies that combines 
to form the U.S. national security infrastructure has its own unique culture. 
The U.S. military has sought to develop cross-cultural competence though a 
number of approaches, one of which is the development of specialists with regional 
expertise. Foreign area officers comprise a specialty field with the Department of 
Defense (DOD) with master’s degrees in regional studies and extensive language 
training. Foreign area officers serve as cultural, political, and strategic affairs experts in 
the DOD (Foreign Area Officer Association, 2020). In 2009, the DOD established a 
program “to develop a cadre of military and senior civilian experts specializing in the 
complexities of Afghanistan and Pakistan—the language, culture, processes and 
challenges” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009, p. 1). In December 2013, the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff mandated a similar program for the Asia Pacific 
region (U.S. Navy, 2020). The U.S. Special Operations Command created a cadre of 
senior special operations officers imbedded with foreign headquarters and partner special 
operations units. These programs focus on area specific knowledge. This is a general 
trend in DOD cross-cultural efforts—seeking improvement in cultural competence 
through culture-specific academic education and training in addition to long-term focus 
on a specific area or country. As I discuss in Chapter 2, this is only one aspect of cross-
cultural competence. 
The U.S. Navy SEALs have developed a program to acquire deep microregional 
expertise through the accession of foreign-born naturalized citizens to create the Naval 
Special Warfare Cultural Engagement Unit (Coover, 2016). These language and regional 





cultures. This insight is deeper and broader than nonnatives educated on a specific region 
or country, and their military training and integration with Navy SEALs provides them 
with the ability for technical translation not available with most linguists/translators.  
Another approach to address the requirement for military cross-cultural 
competency is to develop small teams of experts or develop unit-level cross-cultural 
capacities and expertise. This “expert and focus” approach might include teams of social 
scientists and cultural experts (Finney, 2008; McFate, 2008), army battalions focused on 
a specific region (“Regionally Aligned Brigades,” 2013), or a unit dedicated to training 
foreign partners in boat operations and maintenance and small unit combat skills (“Naval 
Small Craft Instruction and Tactical Training School,” 2020).  
In addition to developing specialists or teams primarily focused on cross-cultural 
interaction, efforts have also focused on broader development of individual cross-cultural 
capacities. For example, at the peak of the DOD’s SOF cross-cultural focus in 2012, 
USSOCOM mandated increased training and raised standards for language proficiency. It 
also mandated cultural training and education across SOF.  
Compared to conventional military units, U.S. SOF have a high degree of 
interaction with foreign counterparts and other agencies and departments in the U.S. 
government (e.g., interagency groups and processes). As a result, cross-cultural 
competence is especially important for SOF. Three of the four special operations 
components include a high frequency of cross-cultural interaction. The U.S. Army 
Special Operations Command, and primarily its Special Forces (also known as Green 
Berets), is the only USSOCOM element that specifically selects personnel for cross-





mission of unconventional warfare, which uses surrogates and proxies and requires 
significant human interaction (U.S. Army, 2008). The Marine Special Operations 
Command and Naval Special Warfare (e.g., Navy SEALs), while not specifically 
selecting for cross-cultural capacities, have significant cross-cultural interactions in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and across the globe in their roles as advisors and trainers to foreign 
partners. The fourth element of U.S. Special Operations, the Air Force Special Operations 
Command, has little cross-cultural interaction with the exception of a relatively small unit 
of trainers who work with foreign air forces (Turnley, 2011).  
The DOD emphasis on cross-cultural understanding and competence has waxed 
and waned. The DOD reached a high watermark during the Vietnam conflict (Abbe & 
Gouge, 2012; Deitchman, 2014) but largely lost interest until the wars in Afghanistan in 
2001 and Iraq in 2003. After a review of the 2018 Annotated Bibliography of Military 
Cross-Cultural Competence (Mackenzie, Gualdin, & Tarza, 2018), it is arguable the 
cross-cultural competence DOD emphasis has peaked and is again in decline. Of the 219 
documents in the bibliography, 165 were published in 2012 or prior with the bulk from 
2008-2012; since 2013, only 54 have been published. This trend of declining emphasis 
and focus applies to U.S. Special Operations as well. Annually, the commander of 
USSOCOM provides a statement to both the U.S. House and U.S. Senate Armed Services 
Committees. Recently, USSOCOM commanders (Clarke, 2019; Thomas, 2018, 2019) 
briefly mentioned working with partners and education in culture and language, but 
cross-cultural issues did not receive the emphasis or focus they did in 2012. Despite the 





the requirement for cross-cultural competence is well established and is not likely to 
abate. 
Relevance to Leadership 
 This research was conducted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a PhD 
in leadership studies. Cross-cultural competence in the SEAL Teams is closely related to 
leadership. In combat and in training, SEALs and other Special Operations Forces are 
often leading combined elements, composed of U.S. and partner forces. There is no more 
difficult leadership challenge than to lead while crossing cultures. This leadership takes 
place at all levels—from the most senior member leading a mission to the most junior 
member of the team acting as an instructor for basic and advanced training or mentoring 
guiding partner nation forces in mission execution. Faced with different cultures and their 
corresponding values and judgments—as well as often contrasting motivations and 
allegiances—leading across cultures can be frustrating. A leader must manage their own 
personal frustration, the frustration of their U.S. teammates, and the frustration of partner 
nation forces. Having the capacity, motivation, and focus on cross-culture competence 
will help improve results for military members leading across cultures. 
Problem Statement 
Price (2011) underscored the root of the U.S military’s cross-cultural 
shortcomings in a comment about a 2004 Initial Impressions Report on operations in 
Mosul, Iraq, from a U.S. Army Stryker brigade: “The residual image is of a pelagic 
military only beginning to become aware of the depths of their own ignorance of the 





awareness continued to grow and be expressed by senior military leaders (Fitzgerald, 
2010; Mak, 2011). 
While arguably more cross-culturally competent than conventional forces 
(Turnley, 2011), U.S. SOF have no explicit conceptualization or framework to guide the 
development of cross-cultural capacity. As interest and awareness in cross-cultural 
competence grew, U.S. Special Operations strategy and guidance documents (SOCOM, 
2012a, 2012b) identified a requirement to operate in the human domain (implying cross-
cultural interaction). The 2012 strategy included significant discussion of working with 
allies, partners, and interagency and proposed an invigorated effort in formal education. 
However, there was no discussion of how to develop, improve, and maintain the cross-
cultural capacity necessary to meet the identified requirements beyond establishing 
language competency goals across the force and mandating undefined cultural education 
and training. In USSOCOM documents, there was no reference to any cross-cultural-
related academic research and no discussion of metrics necessary to measure the progress 
or effectiveness of culture-related education and training efforts. 
 Despite the significant and increasing requirement to effectively function across 
cultures, SOF have no clear framework to design cross-cultural training and education, no 
clear method to measure progress and effectiveness in this area, no process of personnel 
assessment that considers cross-cultural competence and no process specifically tailored 
to personnel assignment related to high-frequency, cross-cultural positions. 
Purpose of the Study 
 In this research, I used demographics to explore whether decision style and 





some people more primed to excel in a cross-cultural environment? If so, perhaps this 
insight into personal capacity or limitations for cross-cultural competence can help focus 
selection and training for these types of missions toward those individuals.  
In this study, I focused on experienced U.S. Navy SEALs and new SEALs who 
recently completed basic SEAL training. I am a retired Navy SEAL who, at the beginning 
of the study, was an active duty senior SEAL officer assigned to Naval Special Warfare 
Command, the higher headquarters for all SEAL commands. My position offered unique 
research access to the SEAL community. Using self-reported instruments of cross-
cultural relevance, I examined the relationships of key variables captured in these 
instruments to individual performance in cross-cultural competence assessments. Two 
objectives were identified for this study. The first objective was to identify personal traits 
(factors) with high correlations to superior or lagging performance in cross-cultural 
competence assessments. If identified, these factors could assist with the design of SOF 
training and education focused on cross-cultural capability and the related measurement 
of program effectiveness. The second objective was to compare new SEAL graduate 
profiles with associated factors related to success or underperformance in cross-cultural 
assessments to help identify areas of education and training to advance recent graduates 
to the level of cross-cultural high performer. Additionally, correlations of demographic 
factors for superior cross-cultural scorers could help identify relatively stable personality 
factors (traits) that might contribute to cross-cultural performance, highlighting both a 
need and a method for cross-cultural-related personnel screening. Understanding 
personality factors that potentially correlate to cross-cultural competence could assist 






In this research, I posed two primary research questions: 
1. Focusing on experienced SEALs, what are the attribute profiles, defined by 
cohort mean scores, of cross-cultural superior and substandard scorers, and 
what is the relationship between demographic and decision style factors and 
individual scores in cross-cultural competence?  
2. Focusing on recent SEAL selection course graduates in the selection course, 
what is the attribute profile, as defined by mean cohort scores, for SEAL 
selection graduates, and how does this profile compare with the profile of an 







REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
In this literature review, I begin with an examination of the concept of culture and 
then discuss the recent emphasis and issues related to the importance of culture for the 
military. On this foundation, I defined and examined cross-cultural competence from a 
historical and military perspective. A review of cross-culture competence models and 
assessments completes this chapter. 
Culture 
Before cross-cultural competence is examined, it is important to explain what is 
meant by culture, a common but “very muddied concept” (Hall, 1959, p. 20) and to 
discuss how the concept of culture was applied in this research. While the culture 
literature is vast, dating back to the 19th century, the culture concept is framed in the two 
quotations that follow from the perspective of operating across cultures (Spitzberg & 
Changnon, 2009), primarily in a military context (Lucas, 2009; McFate, 2005a; Price, 
2011; Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008; Sands & Sands, 2014; Schmorrow & Nicholson, 
2013; Selmeski, 2007; Turnley, 2011; van Driel, 2011). Hall (1959) underscored the 
“muddiness” of the culture concept:  
For anthropologists culture has long stood for the way of life of people, for the 
sum of their learned behavior patterns, attitudes, and material things. Though they 
subscribe to this general view, most anthropologists tend to disagree however, on 
what the precise substance of culture is. . . . In sum, though the concept of culture 
was first defined in print in 1871 by E.B. Taylor, after all these years it still lacks 
the rigorous specificity which characterizes many less revolutionary and useful 
ideas. (p. 20) 
 
Price (2001) described it this way: 
 
Today, anthropologists debate not only the nature (and existence . . .) of culture, 





traits, today few anthropologists would be comfortable with the sort of vulgar 
generalizations that are the basis of [efforts to identify national character or broad 
culture types as attempted by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961), among others]. 
(p. 144) 
 
 Spitzberg and Changnon (2009) considered culture  
a primitive theoretical term, concerned with enduring yet evolving 
intergenerational attitudes, values, beliefs, rituals/customs, and behavioral 
patterns into which people are born but that is structurationally created and 
maintained by people’s ongoing actions. Thus, intercultural competence is the 
appropriate and effective management of interaction between people who, to 
some degree or another, represent different or divergent affective, cognitive, and 
behavioral orientations to the world. These orientations will most commonly be 
reflected in such normative categories as nationality, race, ethnicity, tribe, 
religion, or region. (pp. 6-7) 
 
Acknowledging the debate surrounding culture’s definition and accepting that 
generalizations are prone to inaccuracy, the culture concept should be framed and its 
boundaries established to better understand interactions across cultures. Selmeski (2007) 
provided a useful overview. Culture is not a thing, a social group, a material object, an 
activity, or an officially articulated statement. Culture is dependent upon the whole—not 
isolated parts. Culture is passed across generations—learned, shared, patterned, and 
transmitted in daily life, in taboo and preference, in spoken and unspoken ways. Culture 
is relatively stable but is not static; it is adaptive to biological, political, environmental, or 
social requirements, but not always adapted as might be expected. Culture is influential 
but not predictive. Culture is expressed in multiple forms: (a) embedded as meanings, (b) 
embodied as feelings, and (c) enacted as behaviors. 
Historian Barak Salmoni and anthropologist Paula Holmes-Eber (2008) defined 
culture as “the shared worldview and social structures of a group of people that influence 
a person's and a group's actions and choices” (p. 36). Anthropologist Jessica Turnley 





making strategies that help define what is relevant, the value of those relevant things, and 
subsequently creates assumptions that guide behavior. Turnley (2011) defined culture as 
a set of dynamic, ever changing frames of reference. It is a set of perspectives and 
assumptions created, maintained, and changed by a group of people about the way 
the world works. These assumptions allow people in this group to create shared 
expectations about the behavior of others. They tell us what is relevant. These 
assumptions also color the way in which group members interpret and value what 
they see. These perspectives apply moral weight to behavior. They tell us what is 
good and bad, right and wrong. In short, these frames of reference help make 
sense of the world for us. (p. 15) 
 
In the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Manual, Petraeus (2006) suggested: 
 
Culture might also be described as an “operational code” that is valid for an entire 
group of people. Culture conditions the individual's range of action and ideas, 
including what to do and not do, how to do or not do it, and who to do it with or 
not do it with. Culture also includes under what circumstances the 'rules' shift and 
change. Culture influences how people make judgments about what is right and 
wrong, assess what is important and unimportant, categorize things, and deal with 
things that do not fit into existing categories. Cultural rules are flexible in 
practice. (p. 7) 
 
It is closer to the truth to say, “People live culturally rather than people live in 
cultures” (Selmeski, 2007, p. 4). Those living in culturally different ways have “a 
completely different way of organizing life, of thinking, and of conceiving the underlying 
assumptions about the family and the state, the economic system, and even of mankind” 
(Hall, 1959, p. 23).  
This research is not about culture but rather about crossing cultures—interacting 
and working with others with a different “operational code” or worldview. The most 
comprehensive of the research includes the Global Leadership and Organizational 
Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) project studies (Chhoakar et al., 2007; House et al., 
2004; House et al., 2014) and Javidan’s work on the global mindset and leadership 





determine the effects of cultural differences with a focus on leadership. Cross-cultural 
military operations hinge on military members not only to cross cultures but also to lead 
across cultures. Military personnel deploying to a cross-cultural mission would be well 
advised to have this research in their kit bag. Before the literature on cross-culture 
competence is reviewed, however, the unique aspects of culture and the military are 
considered.  
Culture and the Military 
 The connection between military operations and culture is ancient, tenuous, and 
contentious. By tenuous, I mean, while the importance of cultural knowledge is widely 
recognized by military practitioners, deep understanding of the culture concept and 
examination of specific cultures are rarely pursued. Indeed, it is the rare military 
specialist who pursues an understanding of different cultures with the same focus and 
emphasis as more traditional martial skills. When pursued to improve the military’s  
success in combat, the use of social science and academic cultural knowledge can be 
controversial. According to McFate (2005): 
Cultural knowledge and warfare are inextricably bound. Knowledge of one’s 
adversary as a means to improve military prowess has been sought since 
Herodotus studied his opponents’ conduct during the Persian Wars (490–479 BC). 
Although “know thy enemy” is one of the first principles of warfare, our military 
operations and national security decision making have consistently suffered due to 
lack of knowledge of foreign cultures. pp. 42-43) 
 
As Price (2011) wrote: 
 
I find extraordinary continuities of roles, status, and economic contingencies 
between the military and the academy as many of the present efforts to use 
anthropology for conquest mirror specific failed efforts to use and abuse 
American anthropology during the Second World War and the Vietnam War with 






The invasions of Afghanistan (October 7, 2001; “The History of the Afghanistan War,” 
2012) and Iraq (March 20, 2003; “Timeline: The Iraq War,” 2016) and the resulting 
resistance by irregular local forces, the recognized difficulty U.S. and allied forces had 
defeating these irregular fighters and the apparent inadequate or inappropriate 
interactions with local civilians highlighted the need for improved abilities to interact 
across cultures. According to Ross, MacNulty, Bencaz, Thornson, and Johnston (2010): 
Concerns that the military as a whole is not prepared to conduct operations in a 
way that understands cultures has sparked an influx of research into areas related 
to cross-cultural competence. Instances of stereotyping, racism, and abuse of 
power by military personnel have further showcased the ways in which military 
members have alienated the local populations. For these reasons, the Department 
of Defense has recently made the assessment and training of cross-cultural 
competence a top priority for the military (e.g., Langewiesche, 2004; McFarland, 
2005; Putman, 2004). (p. 1) 
  
Drawing lessons learned from 46 studies and operational war reports from 2003 
through 2012, the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Center (2012) in the DOD 
Joint Staff identified 11 recurring themes in its Decade of War analysis. Under the first 
theme—Understanding the Environment—the authors recommended developing a 
nuanced understanding of the environment through, among other things, improving 
language and culture proficiency. 
By 2005, language and culture became a major area of emphasis in U.S. military 
strategy. The Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (DOD, 2005) and the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review (DOD, 2006a) signaled a top-down emphasis on increased 
cultural capabilities: “Developing broader linguistic capability and cultural understanding 
is . . . critical to prevail in the long war and meet 21st century challenges” (DOD, 2006a, 
p. 78). The Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap(s) for Irregular Warfare 





importance of cultural and regional expertise and language. According to van Driel 
(2011), “A substantial amount of policy and strategy exists regarding the development 
and institutionalization of cross-cultural competence within the Department of Defense” 
(p. 11). This includes DOD directives on Irregular Warfare (DOD, 2008) and Stability 
Operations (DOD, 2009), which place a premium on cultural understanding. In response 
to DOD guidance and emphasis, military services have developed their service-unique 
strategy and a dedicated organization focused on culture and language (see Table 2.1). In 
addition to these service strategies and centers, the Defense Language Institute, located in 




Military Service Culture Centers and Strategies 
 
Service Center Strategy 
U.S. Army U.S. Army Culture Center, Ft. 
Huachuca, Arizona 
Culture and Foreign 
Language Strategy (2009) 
  
U.S. Air Force USAF Culture and Language Center, 
Maxwell  
AFB, Alabama 
Culture, Region, and 
Language Flight Plan (2009) 
 
U.S. Marine Corps USMC Center for Advanced Operational 
Culture Learning, Quantico, Virginia 
 
Vision and Strategy 2025 
(2011) 
U.S. Navy USN Center for Language, Regional 
Expertise, and Culture, Corry Station, 
Florida 
Language Skills, Regional 
Expertise, and Cultural 
Awareness Strategy (2008) 
 
The combination of military operations and cultural study is not without 
controversy and ethical debate. Concerns over “harnessing anthropology and culture for 
the domination of others” (Price, 2011, p. 1) have been expressed in the academic 





As others have pointed out, while World War I was the Chemists’ War and World 
War II the Physicists’ War, the current wars with their heavy reliance on the 
cultural knowledge needed for counterinsurgency and occupation are envisioned 
by many Pentagon strategists as the Anthropologists’ War; yet many in 
Washington seemed truly surprised at the push-back from anthropologists upon 
news of the formation of Human Terrain Teams and other efforts to adapt 
anthropology for counterinsurgency and asymmetrical warfare. (p. 2) 
 
Some (Gonzales, 2007, 2010; Jamail, 2010; Lutz, 2008; Price, 2000, 2001, 2007a, 
2007b, 2008, 2011) reject most, if not all, association of the social sciences, in general, 
and anthropology, specifically, with the military and object to the “militarization” of 
anthropology (Lucas, 2009, p. 7). Other anthropologists advocate for social science 
support to work closely with the military and provide related education and advice 
(Holmes-Eber, 2013; McFate, 2005a, 2005b; Rubinstein, 2013; Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 
2008; Turnley, 2011, 2013; Varhola, 2013).  
Lucas (2009) examined opposing perspectives on moral and ethical grounds. 
They pointed out there are clearly prohibited activities, including illegal interrogation and 
torture, and acknowledged the valid concerns surrounding the protection and security of 
those who are the subject of academic study. However, they argued social science 
support to the government and the military cannot be summarily rejected on moral 
grounds. The moral participation by anthropologists and social scientists extends even to 
wars that might be considered illegal or unjust. According to Lucas (2009): 
It would be possible in principle for the participation by anthropologists in such 
wars [those wars found to be proscribed by international law and failing to satisfy 
just war criteria] to be morally justified, if that participation were aimed at what is 
increasingly termed just post bellum: that is, if anthropological expertise were 
sought solely for the purposes of minimizing casualties, ending conflict, restoring 







Lucas (2009) acknowledged the existence of past moral and ethical failures 
related to social science and anthropologic support to the government and the military 
and the potential for shortfalls and excesses in the future, but Lucas maintained the 
potential for immoral acts does not suggest all acts associated with military operations are 
morally proscribed. 
 The applied ethics argument that Lucus (2009) made—using cultural knowledge 
and developing cross-cultural competence in the military is morally and ethically 
acceptable—addresses the controversy of academic support to the military. Regardless, 
the military application of cross-cultural competence will never be easy or without 
potential controversy. The military is inextricably entwined with armed conflict. In this 
environment, with a significant power differential between the military and the local 
civilians (Selmeski, 2007), some element of the local population is likely to be unhappy 
with the activities or presence of U.S. military personnel. From the extreme cases of 
invasion and occupation to training with military forces where not every citizen supports 
the local government or the local military to the most benign of humanitarian assistance 
operations, there may be distrust of U.S. intentions and outright resistance to military 
activities and external intervention. As compared to the more traditional applications of 
cross-cultural competence (i.e., travel, education, and business), the military application 
of cross-cultural competence will likely face a much broader range of interaction and 
reception as well as more difficulty. More than any other profession, cross-cultural 






While the nature and existence of culture may be debated by anthropologists, 
there is no debate that those traveling abroad, conducting international business or 
military operations overseas, interact with people, who in obvious and subtle ways, are 
different from themselves. Successful interaction with those who view the world 
differently requires some level of competence with crossing cultures. This topic has a rich 
research history of almost 60 years. Seminal works include Hofstede’s (1980) Culture’s 
Consequences and the GLOBE Studies, led by House (Chhoakar et al., 2007; House et al., 
2004; House et al., 2014).  
Research History 
Research on interacting across cultures has roots in the 1950s (Lysgaard, 1955) 
and 1960s (Ezekiel, 1968; Guthrie & Sektick, 1967; Mischel, 1965; Smith, 1966; Smith 
et al., 1963). Early researchers examined Peace Corps volunteers and students studying 
abroad and focused on their capacities to adjust to assignments in foreign countries, 
character traits that may assist in adjustment and performance and the ability to predict 
performance based on assessed traits. Terms like intercultural competence, effectiveness, 
and adaptation can be found in studies from the 1970s (Hammer, Gudykunst, & 
Wiseman, 1978; Ruben, 1976; Ruben & Kealey, 1979) and 1980s (Wiseman & Abe, 
1986). As stated by Spitzberg and Changnon (2009), “By this time, the need for 
interculturally competent government, educational, and business representatives was well 
recognized” (p. 9).  
Hofstede’s (1980) Culture’s Consequences, based on his work with an IBM 





and early 1970s, is foundational in cross-cultural psychology. The cultural dimensions 
and follow-on efforts (House et al., 2004) provide a schema for understanding how 
cultures differ. The GLOBE studies further refined these cultural dimensions and shed a 
light on how culture affects leadership and broader society. The GLOBE studies will be 
discussed further in the culture and leadership subsection. In this sense, research and 
literature about how cultures differ can inform training and education focused on cross-
culture competence, but they do not provide insight into the competence required to 
cross-cultures.  
Recent Military Research  
Over the last decade, the U.S. DOD has invested significant resources into 
understanding and enhancing cross-cultural competence (Gabrenya, Moukarzel, 
Pomerance, Griffith, & Deaton, 2012). The Defense Equal Opportunity Management 
Institute, the Defense Language Office (DLO), and the Army Research Institute have 
been major sponsors of this research (Abbe, 2008; Abbe, Gulick, & Herman, 2007; 
Caligiuri, Raymond, Nolan, Ryan, & Drasgow, 2011; Johnston et al., 2010; McCloskey, 
Beymer, Papaustksy, Ross, & Abbe, 2010; McCloskey, Gandjean, Behymer, & Ross, 
2010; McDonald, McGuire, Johnston, Selmeski, & Abbe, 2008; Paris, 2012; Reid, 
Kaloydis, Sudduth, & Greene-Sands, 2012; Reid, Steinke, et al., 2012; Ross & Thornson, 
2008a, 2008b). This sponsorship and the integration and progressive design of these 
studies have resulted in a notable maturation of military-related, cross-cultural 





Characterization of Cross-Cultural Competence 
 Gabrenya, Moukarzel, et al. (2012), Selmeski (2007), and Spitzberg and 
Changnon (2009) highlighted semantic and conceptual issues with the construct of 
competence. For example, competence is sometimes equated to a set of skills and 
abilities; discussions of knowledge, skills, and abilities are common. However, 
competence has also been discussed as a subjective evaluative impression (Abbe & 
Bortnick, 2010; Turnley, 2011). Selmeski (2007) made a distinction between 
competencies as knowledge, skills, abilities, other and competence as a level of 
performance. Selmeski (2007) argued knowledge, skills, and abilities can be too focused 
on action rather than comprehension and that observable and measurable standards are 
“poorly applied to culture; [they are] too often applied to surface level behavior [and 
ignore] middle and deep levels of culture” (p. 6). 
Furthermore, context can undermine an attempt to establish standards and 
measures of cross-cultural competence (Spitzberg & Cupach, 1984, 2002). One skill or 
behavior may be assessed as competent in one context but not another—“Thus no 
particular skill is likely to ever be universally competent” (Spitzberg & Changnon, 2009, 
p. 6). In this research, I used the definition of competence presented by Abbe and 
Bortnick (2010): “A set of behaviors that describes excellent performance” (p. 14), where 
that set of behaviors requires knowledge, supporting skills and abilities, and 
complementary personality traits. 
As with culture, Selmeski (2007) provided a useful frame of what cross-cultural 
competence is and is not. It is not merely knowledge of international relations or 





foreign language capability. Cross-cultural competence is not merely cultural awareness 
or knowledge of specific cultures. It requires a balance between general knowledge and 
specialization, a firm grasp of the culture concept rather than expertise in a particular 
culture, and an appreciation for the importance of language and the ability to use a 
translator as opposed to the capability to become a linguist. Cross-cultural competence 
requires ongoing, active learning developed through training, education, and 
development. This learning leads to a greater understanding of other people’s way of 
thinking and acting and requires the recognition and acceptance of diversity. Cross-
cultural competence entails a “conversion of this knowledge to action through cultivation 
of positive behaviors, the ability to adapt and integrate awareness to action” (Selmeski, 
2007, p. 12).  
Defining Cross-Cultural Competence 
 Cross-cultural competence refers to a combination of culture-general knowledge, 
skills, abilities, and attitudes (Paris, 2012), including affect and motivation (Abbe et al., 
2007). Cross-cultural competence is developed through education, training, and 
experience (Ross, 2008) and is considered a lifelong process (Reid, Kaloydis, et al., 
2012). Maximizing and leveraging inherent characteristics such as personality traits 
(Reid, Kaloydis, et al., 2012) are also considered a part of cross-cultural competence.  
Cross-cultural competence is “the ability to quickly and accurately comprehend, 
then appropriately and effectively act, in a culturally complex environment to achieve the 
desired effect” (U.S. Air Force, 2009, p. 19). This rapid and accurate comprehension and 
appropriate and effective action should take place despite the lack of in-depth knowledge 





culture may contradict one’s own taken-for-granted assumptions and deeply held beliefs” 
(Selmeski, 2007, p. 12).  
Military Cross-Cultural Competence 
Cross-cultural competence research has been focused on health and social 
sciences (D’Andrea, Daniels, & Heck, 1991; Holcomb-McCoy & Myers, 1999; 
LaFromboise, Coleman, & Hernandez, 1991; Ponterotto et al., 1996; Sodowsky, Kuo-
Jackson, Richardson, & Corey, 1998), diplomacy and international development/aid 
(Ezekiel, 1968; Guthrie & Sektick, 1967; Harris, 1973, 1977; Lysgaard, 1955; Mischel, 
1965; Smith, 1966; Smith et al., 1963), and business (Koester & Olebe, 1988; Matsumoto 
et al., 2001; van der Zee & van Oudenhoven, 2000). However, there are significant 
differences between these sectors and the military (Selmeski, 2007) that require military-
specific focus (Abbe et al., 2007). The consequences of military operations are life and 
death; for business, they are profit and loss; and, even in the medical field, cross-cultural 
competence is focused on patient interaction rather than life and death care. Military 
operations create a greater power differential with the local populace and increase the 
likelihood of local grievances such as occupation, destroyed property, and killing 
(intentionally or unintentionally). While past research on cross-cultural competence 
provides a useful foundation, research specifically focused on the military is needed to 
account for these unique contexts and circumstances. 
Renstch, Gunderson, Goodwin, and Abbe (2007) highlighted negative military 
consequences of cultural ignorance and insufficient cross-cultural competence. These 





At the organizational level, negative public opinion may be generated, and at the strategic 
level, destructive policies may be developed and implemented. 
Cross-cultural competence in the military is not only required for operational and 
tactical success, but it contributes to institutional strength and professional wellbeing 
(Selmeski, 2007). On the tactical and operational front, cross-cultural competence can aid 
in the assessment and management of multicultural diversity with allies and foreign 
partners, and in U.S. units and interactions with sister U.S. services (who maintain a 
different organizational culture). Interaction with noncombatants, including nonmilitary 
government actors, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and 
civilians, can also be positively impacted with cross-cultural competence. This interaction 
with nonmilitary personnel and organizations can be even more difficult than interacting 
with foreign militaries. As Abbe et al. (2007) stated:  
Cross-cultural competence provides capability for a range of settings, including 
but not limited to interactions between two nations. This culture-general 
capability is particularly relevant when knowing one particular foreign culture or 
region is insufficient, such as in multinational operations, and when cultural 
difference are not just national or ethnic, but also organizational in nature . . . . 
Some findings even suggest that differences at the organization level, between 
military services and civilian organizations, may be more influential than 
differences at the national/societal level, between the militaries of different 
nations. (p. 1) 
 
On the institutional front, cross-cultural competence can instill a greater public 
trust and respect and contribute to an increase in self-regulation (making better decisions 
and taking more appropriate action), thereby increasing the degree of autonomy granted 
by stakeholders, including politicians and U.S. citizens (Selmeski, 2007). According to 
Abbe, 2008):  
The ability to look past gender, racial, or cultural differences to find common 





relations more generally. Cultural understanding is important in considering the 
impact of the local population on military operations, as well as predicting and 
understanding adversary intent in planning and conducting . . . operations. (p. 6) 
 
Special Operations Forces and Cross-Cultural Competence 
The USSOCOM, the headquarters in charge of all U.S. SOF, has placed a 
significant emphasis on the ability to operate across cultures. In SOCOM 2020 (SOCOM, 
2012a), a strategic vision for the future of SOF, the need to partner with others and 
operate across cultures was highlighted: 
It is an undeniable reality the U.S. cannot address the challenges of tomorrow 
alone. In an era of increasing responsibilities, competing priorities and reduced 
resources, we must build a Global SOF network of like-minded interagency, 
allies, and partners who proactively anticipate threats and are prepared to operate 
toward cooperative security solutions in cost effective ways. (p. i) 
 
It is critical to maintain robust and frequent collaboration with the Geographic 
Combatant Commanders, interagency, allies, partner nations, coalitions, and our 
military services to ensure this comparative advantage is realized and sustained. 
(p. 2) 
 
Operating in the Human Domain [defined as the totality of the physical, cultural, 
and social environments that influence human behaviors] is a core competency for 
SOF and we are uniquely suited for successful operations or campaigns to win 
population centric conflicts. (p. 1) 
 
In the USSOCOM (2012b) Commander’s Training Guidance, key tasks are 
assigned related to cross-cultural competence, including being culturally attuned and 
operating with foreign partners. This 2012 Commander’s guidance was the first 
significant emphasis on cross-cultural competence, and it continues today in various 
guidance documents. In response, some USSOCOM service components have an 
increased their focus on cross-cultural competence, particularly the U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command and the Naval Special Warfare Command. Reviewing USSOCOM 





construct used by former SOCOM Commander, Admiral Eric Olson, Turnley (2011) 
singled out the Army and their Special Forces (e.g., Green Berets): 
Army SF was the only special operations component that put a heavy emphasis on 
selecting candidates who have an aptitude for the diplomat component of the 
warrior-diplomat construct. In addition to testing for physical fitness, SF also 
looked for candidates who could handle situational and moral ambiguity, had 
strong interpersonal skills, and other attributes that component believed 
contributed to effective cross-cultural interaction. (p. 41) 
 
Not surprisingly, the Special Forces are the first special operations service component to 
develop a tailored training program. The Foundations of Cross-Cultural Competence is a 
16-day course taught at the U.S. John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.  
 The Naval Special Warfare Command recently directed its Naval Special Warfare 
Center (NSWC, 2013) to develop cross-cultural competence training imbedded in the 
assessment and selection course for SEALs. This is a departure from the traditional focus 
for Naval Special Warfare through which “SEALs [are] . . . selected and assessed 
primarily on physical fitness and on psychological qualities that would help candidates 
get through BUD/S (teamwork and the ability to complete tasks under stress)” (Turnley, 
2011, p. 41). 
Cross-Cultural Models 
 Spitzberg and Changnon (2009) described five models used in attempts to frame 
and explain cross-cultural competence. These models are not mutually exclusive, and 
other types may exist, but most will fit in this typology. The individual is the unit of 
analysis for most cross-cultural models. The models most common in military cross-
cultural literature are the development and compositional models, with the most recent 





competence models will be discussed and related literature highlighted at the end of this 
section. The first three models discussed are co-orientation, adaptation, and causal. 
Co-orientation models (Byrum, 1997; Fantini, 1995; Kupka, 2008) have a focus 
on shared meaning and interaction between people of different cultures who develop 
common references and mutual understanding over time and through multiple 
interactions. These models stress relationships, time, and iterative adjustments. Any 
cross-cultural interaction is co-oriented and defined by not one but two (or more) 
individuals. In response to the other from another culture, adjustment and interpretation is 
required. Spitzberg and Changnon (2009) underscored this co-management of a cross-
cultural relationship: “The maintenance of intercultural relationships depends in part, 
therefore on the deft management and balancing of directness and indirectness, 
understanding and misunderstanding, clarity and ambiguity” (p. 20). 
Adaptation models (Berry, Kim, Power, Young, & Bujaki, 1989; Kim, 1988; 
Navas, Rojas, Garcia, & Pumares, 2007) have a focus on adjusting to foreign cultures 
through interacting in them. Expatriates, business personnel assigned overseas, and study 
abroad students are often the focus of these models. Adaptation models underscore a 
foundational assumption of almost all cross-cultural competence models. Adaptability is 
critical to achieving competence; however, “adaptation, in and of itself is a questionable 
criterion for competence” (Spitzberg & Changnon, 2009, p. 29).  
Causal path models (Arasaratnam, 2006; Griffith & Harvey, 2000; Ting-Toomey, 
1999) specify interrelationships among components in a linear system. These models are 





multidimensionality, and nonlinear nature of cross-cultural interaction make any causal 
path exceedingly difficult to map and verify.  
 Development models (Bennett, 1986; Gullahorn & Gullahorn, 1962; King & 
Magdolda, 2005) have an emphasis on stages of progression or maturity over time and 
are commonly used when training and development are the primary focus. According to 
Spitzberg and Changnon (2009), “Developmental models . . . tend to be strong in 
modeling systemic states of change but corresponding weak in specifying the 
interpersonal and intercultural competence traits that facilitate or moderate the course of 
such evolution” (p. 24). 
Selmeski (2007), McDonald et al. (2008), Reid, Kaloydis, et al. (2012), and the 
U.S. Air Force Language and Culture Flight Plan (U.S. Air Force, 2009) have 
emphasized stages or levels of progression common in development models. However, 
very recent military-related models can be considered both developmental—in their focus 
on training and progression of cross-cultural competence through a career—and 
compositional. 
Compositional models (Deardorff, 2006; Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998) list 
relevant traits, characteristics, and skills, but, unlike causal path models, they do not 
specify relationships among these components. The DLO framework for cross-cultural 
competence (Johnston, Paris, McDCoy, Severe, & Hughes, 2010) represents “the most 
carefully constructed conceptualization of 3C for the U.S. Military at this time” 
(Gabrenya, Moukarzel, et al., 2012, p. 3). The DLO framework is considered a 
compositional model (Gabrenya, Moukarzel, et al., 2012), and, as with any model, there 





Compositional models have been very useful in defining the basic scope and 
contents that a theory on intercultural communication competence needs to 
incorporate. They are theoretically weak, however, in their ability to specify 
conditional relations among the components. They are also theoretically weak in 
leaving fundamentally undefined the precise criteria by which competence itself is 
defined. It is generally not clear, in other words, what constitutes competence in 
these models—what levels of proficiency, what specific combination of criteria or 
outcomes, would be determinative of competence? (p. 15) 
 
This weakness of compositional models underscores the previous discussion of 
competence and the difficulty of translating or mapping competencies (e.g., KSAOs) into 
competence (e.g., outcomes and overall/holistic performance). However, the DLO 
framework for cross-cultural competence, using a hybrid compositional-development 
model, does attempt to characterize proficiency at various stages and identifies 
combinations of KSAOs that contribute to competency at each stage. 
Abbe et al. (2007) provided the first theoretical cross-cultural competence model 
focused on the military, and their work served as the foundation for ensuing related 
military research (Reid, Kaloydis, et al., 2012). In Abbe et al.’s (2007) framework, cross-
cultural competence consisted of three main components: (a) knowledge and cognition, 
(b) affect and motivation, and (c) skills. These components contained multiple 
subcomponents (see Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 
 
Cultural Competence Framework 
 
Knowledge and Cognition Affect and Motivation Skills 
Cross-Cultural Awareness Empathy Interpersonal Skills 
Cross-Cultural Schema Need for Closure Self-Regulation 
Cognitive Complexity Attitudes & Initiative Flexibility 
Note. Adapted from “Cross-Cultural Competence in Army Leaders: A Conceptual and Empirical 
Foundation,” by A. Abbe, L. M. V. Gulick, and J. L. Herman, 2007. Copyright 2007 by the U.S. 








Abbe et al. (2007) identified antecedents as a contributor to cross-cultural 
competence. Antecedents include life history and experience, stable dispositional 
(personality) traits, and self-identity (ego strength and self-efficacy).  
Researchers of subsequent studies (Hardison et al., 2009; McCloskey, Behymer, 
et al., 2010; McCloskey, Gandjean, et al., 2010; McDonald et al., 2008; Ross et al., 2010) 
have refined and restated critical components of military cross-cultural competence and 
identified related learning objectives and supporting competencies and behaviors. 
Johnston et al. (2010) developed and Johnston, Paris, Wisecarver, Ferro, and Hope 
(2011) later refined a framework for cross-cultural competence. In this framework, six 
core competencies and 13 core enablers were identified and are depicted in Table 2.3. 
Core competencies can be characterized as abilities—cognitive, behavioral and 
attitudinal characteristics—while enablers are akin to personality traits. These enablers 
provide motivation and behavioral “traction;” skills can be taught and attained but 
without the motivating/enabling personality traits people will not always use their skills 
effectively. Paris (2012) underscored, “Personnel with good core competencies, who lack 
the accompany core enablers, may be at risk in situations with extensive and stressful 
social interactions” (p. 4). Abbe et al. (2007) took this line of thought further: “When 
individuals are operating in these ambiguous situations [with many unknowns regarding 
the norms of behavior, social roles, and expectations], personality may be the dominant 
factor that guides individual behavior” (p. 4). Reid, Kaloydis, et al. (2012) identified six 
core competencies and 10 supporting enablers in the latest iteration of the DLO 









Framework of Cross-Cultural Competence Core Competencies and Core Enablers 
 
Core Competencies  Core Enablers 
Thinking Factors 
 




Communication Cognition Learning 




  Low Need for Closure Inquisitiveness 
  Suspending of 
Judgment 
 
  Inclusiveness  
Organizational 
Awareness 
Interpersonal Skills Emotion Interaction 
  Stress Resilience Social Flexibility 
  Emotional Regulation Willingness to Engage 
Cultural Perspective 
Taking 
Cultural Adaptability Self  
  Self-Confidence  
  Self-Identity  
  Optimism  
Note. Adapted from “Framework for Cross-Cultural Competence and Learning Recommendations,” 




Framework for Understanding Cross-Cultural Competence 
 
Core Competencies Supporting Enablers 
Inclusiveness Tolerance for ambiguity 
Self-efficacy 
Patience Inquisitiveness 
Willingness to engage 
Openness to Experience 
Self-efficacy 
Tolerance for Uncertainty Self-efficacy 
Cultural Learning Inquisitiveness 




Self-Awareness Leveraging personal attributes 
Self-efficacy 
Note. Adapted from “A Framework for Understanding Cross-Cultural Competence in the 
Department of Defense,” by P. Reid, F. O. Kaloydis, M. M. Sudduth, and A. Greene-Sands, 2012, 






Reid, Kaloydis, et al. (2012) for the first time in the framework, as depicted in 
Table 2.4, associated supporting enablers (directly under supported core competencies) 
with specific core competences; some supporting enablers apply to multiple core 
competencies. Since 2008, significant work and steady progress has been accomplished 
in refining a model for military cross-cultural competence. However, shortfalls remain. 
As Gabrenya, Griffith, et al. (2012) observed: 
Competence models of 3C [cross-cultural competence] share several limitations 
that persist within the intercultural adjustment and performance literature: (1) 
imprecision in defining constructs, often in the absence of operationalization; (2) 
conceptual overlap and unsatisfactory distinctions among key model components 
such as antecedents, KSAOs, and performance outcomes; (3) imprecision in 
specifying the causal order among constructs; and (4) imprecision or poor 
articulation of competencies with respect to the U.S. Military’s practical selection 
needs due to insufficient attention to MOS [Military Occupational Specialty], 
rank, and service variables. These shortcomings limit the predictive and 
explanatory ability of existing 3C models, and consequently limit the predictive 




A number of DOD-sponsored studies reviewed existing measures related to cross-
cultural competence (Abbe, Geller, & Everett, 2010; Abbe et al., 2007; Gabrenya, 
Griffith, et al., 2012; Gabrenya, Mouskarzel, et al., 2011; Ross & Thornson, 2008b). 
These measures were derived primarily from business and the medical/mental health 
industry, and the vast majority were self-report measures. According to Gabrenya, 
Griffith, et al. (2012), “Self-reports of cross-cultural skills and abilities have been 
criticized on methodological grounds and may have questionable validity” (p. 7). 
However, no viable alternative exists; comprehensive peer or expert measurements do not 
exist and would involve significant amounts of time, effort, and potential intrusion upon, 





Measures in these DOD-sponsored studies were selected based on the reliability 
and validity evidence in the research literature. Across all studies, no existing measure of 
cross-cultural competence was deemed sufficient to measure military cross-cultural 
competence as depicted in the DLO framework. Gabrenya, Griffith, et al.’s (2012) 
analysis was the most comprehensive, identifying 33 instruments and evaluating each 
instrument for face, construct, and criterion validity:  
In depth examination of the instruments available for assessing 3C [cross-cultural 
competence] competencies and enablers revealed a serious paucity of good 
instruments. Instruments commonly put forth as available to 3C researchers 
proved to be inadequate or of little use; and several of the most highly visible 
instruments were found to have serious shortcomings. (p. iv) 
 
Overall, these findings indicate that insufficient instrumentation is available to 
assess the DLO Framework, in particular its core competencies. While many 
candidate instruments were judged to be of insufficient quality, others were 
rejected because sufficient validation evidence is currently unavailable. (p. 73) 
 
Abbe et al. (2007) found none of the 11 measurements examined in their study 
were uniquely suited to measure military cross-culture competence: 
Although existing measures are available to measure some aspects of cross-
cultural competence, the validity of these measures has not been established for a 
military population. Context and population differences warrant the development 
of measures specifically for the population of interest, with an emphasis on 
constructs and methods for use in training and development. (p. viii) 
 
Abbe et al. (2010) compared four leading measures in a population of U.S. Army 
soldiers and military cadets and questioned their application in a military context. Most of 
the existing measures have not been used in a military context and, due to differences in 
context and roles, their utility is unclear. The characteristics required for a soldier 
working in a cross-cultural environment are largely different from students studying in a 
foreign country (Abbe et al., 2010). Although many instruments exist, researchers have 





measures has been conducted, and corresponding overlap and redundancies among them 
has not been established (Abbe et al., 2010).  
Abbe et al. (2007) underscored the likely necessity of a tailored measurement for 
military purposes. An excellent example is the Global Mindset Inventory. Described as 
“the world’s first and only psychometric assessment tool that measures and predicts 
performance in global leadership positions” (Mansour, Hough, & Bullough, 2010, p. 1), 
the Global Mindset Inventory was developed primarily from a corporate business 
perspective with items that include global business savvy. This inventory is a well-
researched and scientifically developed tool that can be applied to military personnel but 
would need to be significantly improved if adapted to a military context.  
Military-Related Assessments of Cross-Cultural Competence  
 Three measures specifically focused on military cross-cultural competence have 
been developed: (a) Cross-Cultural Competence Self-Assessment (Sudduth, 2012), (b) 
Cross-Cultural Competence Inventory (Ross, Thornson, et al., 2010), and (c) Cross-
Cultural Assessment Tool (C-CAT; McCloskey et al., 2012). Unfortunately, these tools 
have not been subjected to confirmatory research and validation. All of these measures 
are based upon the DLO framework. Specific validity and reliability data are discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
The Cross-Cultural Competence Self-Assessment (Sudduth, 2012) is a 62-item 
survey measuring eight dimensions. This online survey takes 15-20 minutes to complete 
and uses dimension measurements derived from independently validated measures with 
proven validity and reliability. Three of the eight dimensions from Sudduth (2012) are 





items that are unique in Sudduth, three—stress resilience, inclusiveness, and 
inquisitiveness—map directly to the DLO framework; the other two—optimism and 
suspending judgment—are prominent factors in the broader military literature. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, these five dimensions are included in the cross-cultural 
competence instrument used in this research. 
 The Cross-Cultural Competence Inventory (Ross, Thornson, et al., 2010) is a 47-
item survey measuring six dimensions. The Cross-Cultural Competence Inventory survey 
takes 10-15 minutes to administer. Unique among the military-related measures, Ross, 
Thornson, et al. (2010) introduced a lie scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) that allows 
for the exclusion of responses that do not meet the lie-scale criterion. All dimensions 
from Ross, Thornson, et al. map directly to the DLO framework, and all but one 
dimension are replicated in McCloskey et al. (2012). The unique dimension in Ross, 
Thornson, et al. is self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is prominent throughout the military 
literature (Abbe et al., 2007; Reid, Kaloydis, et al., 2010) and is the only supporting 
enabler in the DLO framework that is considered to enable most (five of six) core 
competencies. Both the Ross, Thronson, et al. lie scale and the self-efficacy dimension 
are included in the cross-cultural competence instrument used in this research. 
 McCloskey et al. (2012) developed the C-CAT as the latest iteration of the DLO 
framework-inspired instrument and is the most comprehensive military-related 
instrument. The Situational Judgment Test (SJT) and a scenario-based assessment were 
added to address the limitations of only a self-report assessment approach (e.g., limited to 
measuring self-perceptions and social desirability bias). The SJT was developed based on 





addition to the SJT, a scenario-based vignette measure was specifically developed based 
on the five dimensions in McCloskey et al.: (a) cultural maturity, (b) cognitive flexibility, 
(c) interpersonal skills, (d) cultural knowledge, and (e) cultural acuity. 
Furthermore, peer and supervisor rating reports were developed as a measure of 
performance. This allows comparison between the assessment battery results and a 
measure of performance. Peer evaluations were chosen as a measure of performance 
instead of the SJT and vignette assessment to reduce the amount of time required of 
participants and broaden the frame of reference. The Cl-CAT battery, without the omitted 
SJT and vignette assessment, takes between 30 to 40 minutes to complete, not including 
peer or supervisor assessments. The C-CAT displayed adequate reliability and validity, 
which are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. This research used the C-CAT with 
augmentation from specific elements of Ross, Thornson, et al. (2010) and Sudduth 
(2012). The individual factors with this instrument are discussed in Chapter 3. 
Integrative Complexity  
The literature includes numerous references to the cognitive aspect of cross-
cultural competence, including references to metacognition (Lane, 2007), multicultural 
perspective taking (Paris, 2012; Reid, Kaloydis, et al., 2012; Rentsch, Gunderson, 
Goodwin, & Abbe, 2007), and cognitive complexity (Abbe et al., 2007). However, none 
of the iterations of the DLO cross-cultural competence framework (Abbe et al., 2007; 
Johnston et al., 2011; Reid, Kaloydis, et al., 2012) touch upon integrative complexity, and 
no known assessments of cross-cultural competence include integrative complexity as an 
element. Integrative complexity refers to the “capacity and willingness to acknowledge 





conceptual links among these perspectives (integration)” (Suedfeld, Tetlock, & Strefert, 
1992, p. 254). According to Tadmore, Tetlock, and Peng (2009): 
Forty years of psychological research has shown that integrative complexity 
affects performance on a variety of cognitive and interpersonal tasks. . . . Within a 
cross-cultural context, integrative complexity reflects the degree to which people 
accept the reasonableness of clashing cultural perspectives on how to live and, 
consequently, the degree to which they are motivated to develop cognitive 
schemas that integrate these competing world views by explaining who different 
people can come to such divergent conclusions or by specifying ways of blending 
potentially discordant norms and values. (p. 106) 
 
 Integrative complexity can be developed, and promising results (S. Savage & J. 
Lith, personal communication, 2013) have been reported in interventions for addressing 
radicalization and involvement in violent extremism such as Islamic/Al Qaida 
radicalization, Scottish sectarianism, and theological clashes (e.g., Northern Ireland). 
There is reason to believe integrative complexity could contribute to the development of 
military cross-cultural competence.  
It is unclear why integrative complexity is relatively absent in the cross-cultural 
competence literature, but there is a good reason it is not included in related assessments. 
The assessment is time consuming and requires significantly more effort for both the 
respondents and the researchers. Two options for assessment of integrative complexity 
exist. The first is an in-depth interview that includes 12 questions and, on average, takes 
over 2.5 hours. The second includes four open-ended questions requiring three written 
paragraphs in response to each question. It was highly doubtful military respondents 
would have the time or inclination to complete either option; in addition, the scale 
requires obtaining generalizable results, which would most likely be overwhelming for a 





There are several factor assessments that have been shown to be negatively 
correlated with integrative complexity, namely personal need for structure and need for 
cognitive closure. While personal need for structure is not mentioned in the literature, 
need for closure is mentioned in early iterations of the framework (Abbe et al., 2007; 
Johnston et al., 2011). Personal need for structure was included in the research instrument 
as part of a cognitive styles assessment. 
Cognition Styles 
Cognition is a major theme running through the cross-cultural competence 
literature. While the three prominent military-related 3C assessments have integrated 
some degree of cognition (i.e., cognitive flexibility, suspending judgment, sense making) 
into their measurements, it seems worthwhile to focus part of the assessment on a 
cognitive style assessment. Thompson (1998) developed a cognitive style assessment and 
applied it to Canadian military forces: “Cognitive styles are differences that document 
individuals’ preferred information gathering and decision making styles” (p. i). This 
cognitive style assessment included a subscale for personal need for structure, which is 
negatively correlated with integrative complexity. Additionally, it has subscales for 
personal fear of invalidity, need for cognition, and rigidity. These factors are discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
The Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Project 
The focus of this dissertation is what individuals bring to cross-cultural 
engagement—individual traits and abilities that enable or derail competence in a cross-
cultural military mission. Although it is not a primary focus of this research, 





information requirement. Additionally, the local expectations placed upon leaders and 
how leadership effectiveness is assessed in a culture is also important to success in 
military cross-cultural engagements. For these reasons, a summary of the GLOBE project 
is included in this literature review.  
The GLOBE project is perhaps the most comprehensive cross-cultural 
competence research effort ever conducted and “could be considered the Manhattan 
Project of the study of cultures in relation to the concepts of leadership” (House et al., 
2004, p. ix). More than 170 investigators from 62 cultures collected data from 17,300 
managers in 951 organizations producing an encyclopedia of findings linking culture to 
leadership and societal functioning. To date, the project has produced hundreds of articles 
and three books, including Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 
62 Societies (House et al., 2004), Culture and Leadership Across the World: The GLOBE 
Book of In-Depth Studies of 25 Societies (Chhokar, Brodbeck, & House, 2007), and 
Strategic Leadership Across Cultures: The GLOBE Study of CEO Leadership Behavior 
and Effectiveness in 24 Countries (House et al., 2014).  
Although focused on three non-military industries (financial services, food 
processing, and telecommunications), the insight generated from the GLOBE project 
should be leveraged by military personnel who cross cultures and should be well 
understood by military personnel who have a primary mission of crossing cultures (e.g., 
within DOD: Foreign Area Officers, AF-PAK Asia-Pacific Hands, and within SOF; U.S. 
Army Special Forces and Military Information Support Operations/Psychological 
Operations, and SOCOM Foreign Liaison Officers). The GLOBE project can be used as a 





different culture. This structure applies directly to the findings related to the C3 attribute 
of cultural relativism.  
The GLOBE Framework  
The GLOBE project identified 10 cultural clusters, nine major attributes of 
culture, and six major global leader behaviors (see Tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7). The GLOBE 
project measured both practices (what was done) and values (what should be done) across 
62 cultures divided into ten cultural clusters. For both practices and values, attributes of 
culture and leadership behaviors within these cultural clusters were generally consistent 
while across these cultures the GLOBE project discovered significant variations. 
Knowing what members of a foreign culture consider to be effective or ineffective 
behaviors can improve conflict resolution and cross-cultural performance (House et al., 
2004). Cultural clusters can provide a useful framework for managing the complexities of 
multinational military operations. House et al. (2004) provided empirical findings for the 
nine cultural attributes. The comparisons of high and low scoring cultures for these 
attributes is instructive and can help set expectations for training and development, a key 








GLOBE Study Cultural Clusters 
 
Region Cluster 
Latin American Costa Rica, Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico, El Salvador, Columbia, 
Guatemala, Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina 
 
Anglo England (and societies dominated by the English), Australia, South 
Africa (White sample), Canada, New Zealand, Ireland, and USA 
  
Latin Europe Italy, Portugal, Spain, France, Switzerland [French-speaking], Israel 
 
Nordic Europe Kingdoms of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark; culturally and 
historically Finland and Iceland are often considered part of this area 
 
Germanic Europe The Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, former West Germany, and 
former East Germany 
 
Confucian Asia Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, China, and Japan 
Sub-Saharan Africa Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and South Africa (Black 
sample) 
 
Middle East Qatar, Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, and Kuwait as well as North Africa— 
Mauritania, Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and 
Egypt 
 
Southern Asia Iran, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand 
 
Eastern Europe Hungary, Russia, Kazakhstan, Albania, Poland, Greece, Slovenia, and 
Georgia 
Note. Adapted from Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies, 











GLOBE Study Culture Attributes 
 
Attribute Description 
Power Distance Degree to which members expect power to be distributed 
equally 
 
Uncertainty Avoidance Extent to which a society, organization, or group relies on social 
norms, rules, and procedures to alleviate unpredictability of 
future events 
 
Humane Orientation Degree to which individuals are encouraged and rewarded for 
being fair, altruistic, generous, caring, and kind to others 
 
Institutional Collectivism Degree to which organizational and societal institutional 
practices encourage and reward collective distribution of 
resources and collective action 
 
In-Group Collectivism Degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and 
cohesiveness in their organizations or families 
 
Assertiveness The degree to which individuals are assertive, confrontational, 
and aggressive in their relationships with others 
 
Gender Egalitarianism The degree to which a collective minimizes gender inequality 
 
Future Orientation The extent to which individuals engage in future-oriented 
behaviors such as delaying gratification, planning, and investing 
in the future 
 
Performance Orientation The degree to which a group encourages and rewards group 
members for innovation, high standards, performance 
improvement and excellence 
Note. Adapted from Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies, 










GLOBE Study Leadership Dimensions 
 
Dimension Description 
Charismatic/Value-Based Leadership Reflects ability to inspire, to motivate, and to 
expect high performance outcomes from others 
based on firmly held core values 
 
Team-Oriented Leadership Emphasizes effective team building and 
implementation of a common purpose or goal 
among team members 
 
Participative Leadership Reflects the degree to which managers involve 
others in making and implementing decisions 
 
Autonomous Leadership Refers to independent and individualistic 
leadership attributes 
 
Humane-Oriented Leadership Reflects supportive and considerate leadership but 
also includes compassion and generosity 
 
Self-Protective Leadership From a Western perspective, focuses on ensuring 
the safety and security of the individual and group 
through status enhancement and face saving 
Note. Adapted from Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies, 
by R. J. House, P. J. Hanges, M. Javidan, P. W. Dorfan, and V. Gupta, 2004. Copyright 2004 by 
Sage. 
 
Leadership and Culture  
Views of the importance, value, style, or delivery of leadership vary across 
cultures (House et al., 2004). However, there are some common perspectives on what 
constitutes good or poor leadership: “The portrait of a leader who is universally viewed 
as effective is clear; the person should possess the highest levels of integrity and engage 
in Charismatic/Value-Based behaviors while building effective teams” (House et al., 
2004, p. 678). Conversely, “self-protective and malevolent (attributes or activities) are 
universally viewed as impediments to effective leadership” (House et al., 2004, p. 678). 
Other leadership dimensions are culturally contingent; some cultures view them 





close attention when crossing cultures. While the findings and useful insights of the 
GLOBE project are beyond the focus of this dissertation, their use to military leaders is 
significant, as House et al. (2004) highlighted: 
For instance, military and civilian service members who enforce [United 
Nations]-mandated peacekeeping operations should find it useful to understand 
indigenous cultural dimensions and their effective leadership profiles to lead and 
function successfully within a foreign population. It seems that this information 
would be especially helpful to them because they act not only in the cultural 
context of their member nation, but also have the extra burden of a military 
culture to uphold. (p. 709)  
 
Literature Review Summary 
A review of the literature underscored that culture is fluid both conceptually and 
in practice. It is enduring yet evolving. People live culturally, in that culture can be seen 
as sense-making strategies or an operational code implemented by groups of people. 
Culture defines a group’s range of ideas (what is important and unimportant) and actions 
(what is right and wrong) as well as how, when, and from whom in and outside the group 
actions are appropriate or inappropriate. These rules are flexible; culture also helps 
interpret when to implement rules and when they might not apply. All of this makes 
crossing cultures exceptionally challenging.  
The relationship between the military and the study and use of cultural insight is 
ancient, controversial, and tenuous. Some have rejected any association between military 
efforts and anthropology and culture. Others have argued increased cultural knowledge 
and insight can minimize casualties, shorten conflicts, and help restore peace. The U.S. 
military interest in cultural insight and education has waxed and waned throughout its 
history. Recently, DOD-sponsored research into cross-cultural competence peaked from 





DOD interest in research into cross-cultural appears to be waning, based on the declining 
number of recent related academic studies. The U.S. Special Operations community, 
including Navy SEALs, have a high degree of foreign partner and local population 
interaction, especially when compared to conventional units in the Army, Navy, or Air 
Force. Cross-cultural competence is vitally important to special operations forces.  
This dissertation is focused on what individuals bring to cross-cultural 
engagement—their individual traits and abilities. Nevertheless, a review of literature 
would be lacking without mention of the GLOBE project, which can be used as a guide 
for crossing cultures, offering a framework and structure to observe and interact with 
different cultures. This is especially relevant to the cultural relativism factor on C3. 
This literature review has established competence is a set of behaviors of 
excellent performance—behaviors requiring knowledge, skills and abilities, and 
complementary personality traits as well as affect and motivation. For the purposes of 
this research, cross-cultural competence is defined as appropriately and effectively acting 
in a culturally complex environment to achieve mission results—through the ability to 
quickly and accurately understand and respond to cultural dynamics. Cross-cultural 
competence requires the recognition and acceptance of diversity and conversion of 
knowledge into action through cultivation of positive behaviors, adaptability, and 
integration of awareness into action. 
The DLO cross-cultural competence framework (see Table 2.4) was the latest 
iteration of a C3 model when this study began and is the foundation for military-focused 
C3 assessments. The C3 assessment used in this research is a combination of three DOD 





Thornson, et al., 2010) and the Cross-Cultural Assessment Tool (McCloskey et al., 2012). 
In Table 2.8, I identify the source of 11 specific C3 instruments used in this study. 
Table 2.8 
 














Self-Efficacy Lie Scale*    
McCloskey 











Note: *The lie scale is not considered an aspect of cross-cultural competence but is used in the C3 
assessment to identify potential outlier responses. 
 
The literature has numerous references to the cognitive aspects of military cross-
cultural competence, including metacognition, multicultural perspective taking, and 
cognitive complexity. However, neither existing frameworks nor assessments address this 
aspect of C3. Integrative complexity is the ability to acknowledge competing perspectives 
on the same issues as legitimate and the ability to connect multiple and often competing 
perspectives into a coherent frame. Integrative complexity is a task of differentiation and 
integration. Tadmore, Tetlock, and Peng (2009) highlighted how integrative complexity 
can help in a cross-cultural context. Because assessing integrative complexity is 
challenging and time-consuming for both study participants and researchers, cognition 
styles are used as a proxy. Thompson (1998) provided four instruments to assess 
cognition styles: personal need for structure, fear of invalidity, need for cognition, and 
rigidity. Thompson was the first to explore correlations between cognition styles and 







In this chapter, I review the context and significance of this research, the research 
objectives, and the research design and methodology. Organized around two primary 
research questions, I define the study populations and samples, summarize the research 
instruments and instrument procedures, and present data analyses. The chapter closes 
with a review of research limitations. 
Overview 
 
The research was conducted through two parallel studies with integrated analysis 
across both studies. In the first study, I examined the SEAL selection course and 
established an attribute profile of recent graduates. In the second study, I examined 
experienced SEAL performance through an assessment of cross-cultural competence 
factors and established attribute profiles of (a) superior cross-cultural assessment scorers 
and (b) substandard cross-cultural assessment scorers. Institutional Review Board and 
Navy SEAL senior leader approval was obtained prior to the research. 
Research Foundation 
In this section, I review the objectives and context of this research. This research 
is unique in that it is the only known study focused on Navy SEAL cross-cultural 
competence and the only known study of cross-cultural competence that uses cognition 









Research Objectives  
The goal of this research was to inform and potentially improve effectiveness of 
U.S Navy SEAL and other SOF cross-cultural-related selection, training, education and 
development, and personnel assignment. I sought to identify key attributes among SEALs 
that are correlated with performance in cross-cultural environments. Two supporting 
objectives were pursued to identify a baseline starting point and a benchmark objective of 
SEAL cross-cultural-related factors. The first supporting objective was to determine the 
attribute profile of recent graduates from SEAL selection based on mean scores across 
two assessment tools. The second supporting objective was to identify, in the SEAL 
community, personal attributes (demographic and cognition style factors) correlated with 
superior and substandard performances in cross-cultural competence factors.  
This knowledge could assist with the design of SOF training and education 
focused on cross-cultural capabilities and the measurement of related program 
effectiveness. Comparing recent SEAL selection graduate profiles with detected 
attributes related to success or underperformance in cross-cultural environments could 
also help identify and prioritize areas of training and education to move recent graduates 
and low assessment scorers toward the level of cross-cultural superior assessment scorers. 
Furthermore, insight into cross-cultural superior-performer attributes may assist with 
improving personnel assignments to positions requiring high cross-cultural capabilities. 
Research Context 
This research was not about comparisons of cultures. Rather, my focus was on the 
relatively small community of U.S. Navy SEALs—3,394 were active duty at the time of 





to performance when SEALs work with foreign partners. This research was about cross-
cultural competence factors at an individual level of analysis.  
This research was conducted in the context of (a) unprecedented public attention 
on SEALs; (b) a contrast between an increasing cross-cultural engagement mission set 
and a traditional low prioritization of cross-cultural interaction in the SEAL community; 
(c) mission assignments across deployed SEAL platoons that vary in cross-cultural 
interaction; and (d) an increasing SEAL community focus on personal attributes and the 
potential of analytics to inform personnel assignments and training, education, and 
development.  
The topic of U.S. Navy SEALs is increasing in popular culture, including recent 
books such as No Easy Day, Lone Survivor, Fearless, and American Sniper; movies, such 
as Zero Dark Thirty, Lone Survivor, Act of Valor, and Captain Phillips; and video games, 
such as SOCOM 4: U.S. Navy SEALs and Medal of Honor (“United States Navy SEALs 
in Popular Culture,” 2019). This attention has skyrocketed following widely publicized 
operations, including high-profile hostage rescues of Captain Richard Phillips of the 
Maersk Alabama from pirates off the coast of Somalia in 2009 (McFadden & Shane, 
2009), aid workers held by Al Shabaab inside Somalia in 2012 (Lawrence, 2012), and the 
2011 raid that killed Osama Bin Laden (“Bin Laden’s Death: How the Story Unflded,” 
2013). In response to this unprecedented public exposure, the SEAL community is 
scrutinizing all public interactions and engagement. It is only because I was a senior 
Navy SEAL officer that I was granted access to conduct this study. 
Acculturation, which traditionally deemphasizes cross-cultural interaction, begins 





Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training, the SEAL selection course is widely 
recognized as one of the most difficult in the world—a 21-week course with an attrition 
rate of 64%. Turnley (2011) observed, “SEALs [are] . . . selected and assessed primarily 
on physical fitness and on psychological qualities that would help candidates get through 
BUD/S (teamwork and the ability to complete tasks under stress)” (p. 38). However, as 
Turnley (2011) noted, capability for cross-cultural interaction is not a priority in SEAL 
selection: 
Army Special Forces was the only special operations component that put a heavy 
emphasis on selecting candidates who have an aptitude for the diplomat 
component of the warrior-diplomat construct. In addition to testing for physical 
fitness, Special Forces [selection course] also looked for candidates who could 
handle situational and moral ambiguity, had strong interpersonal skills, and other 
attributes that component [Army Special Forces] believed contributed to effective 
cross-cultural interaction. [In contrast,] though there is a growing set of post-
selection, region-specific courses on languages and cultures, the SEALs’ culture 
seems to be one that emphasizes the warrior portion of the [warrior-diplomat] 
equation. (p. 41) 
 
The heritage and focus of U.S. Navy SEALs, from their predecessors in World 
War II to the first SEALs in Vietnam and into the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
have been on direct action raids (U.S. Navy, 2013). Among other requirements, these 
missions require violence of action and minimized contact with the civilian populace 
(U.S. Navy, 2013).  
The historical mission focus and related organizational and cultural preference for 
minimizing contact with the populace stands in contrast to the evolution of the recent 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These conflicts transitioned from unilateral U.S. action to 
partnered action with a U.S. lead, and later to partner Iraqi- or Afghan-led, action. 
Furthermore, the counter-insurgency doctrine (Petraeus, 2006) applied to these wars 





forces and engaging and protecting the civil population. Outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the primary special operations mission during this same timeframe was consistent—to 
advise, assist, and train with partner forces to increase their internal capacity to address 
threats to partner nation stability. Despite a preference for more direct action 
assignments, Navy SEALs routinely conduct advise and assist missions. The USSOCOM 
has emphasized increased focus on relationships with international and U.S. interagency 
partners in its USSOCOM 2020 strategy (USSOCOM, 2012a). All of this highlights a 
requirement for cross-cultural capability that is not part of the traditional SEAL focus or 
culture (Turnley, 2011). Culture and focus are established at the selection course and 
reinforced in SEAL platoons. 
When SEALs complete the selection course and a follow-on qualification course, 
they are assigned to a SEAL platoon. This small tactical element is composed of 21 men 
ranging in rank from midgrade enlisted personnel (E-5) to junior officers (O-3). Women 
are eligible for assignment as SEALs, but no woman has yet screened for the SEAL 
selection course. Depending on the mission, a SEAL platoon may be distributed into 
multiple smaller elements (four to eight men) or stay together as an integral unit of 21.  
During this research, SEALs were assigned to missions throughout the Pacific, 
Africa, the Middle East, South America, Europe, and Afghanistan. In each location, 
mission assignments varied in their degrees of cross-cultural interaction. For example, 
some platoons or smaller task elements were imbedded with partner forces, having close, 
daily cross-cultural contact for the entire deployment. These platoons had a mission of 
advise and assist, essentially training and mentoring their partner forces. Other SEAL 





and hostage rescues. These contingency forces had only episodic interactions with partner 
forces for relative short exercise periods (4 to 8 weeks at a time).  
While the degree of cross-cultural interaction across different SEAL platoons may 
vary widely, the key dependent variable under study is relative superior or substandard 
cross-cultural competence factors across the study population. The assignment of 
different missions may create a dichotomy of perspectives with high cross-cultural 
engagement platoons seeing their roles, their partners, and themselves differently than 
those assigned a contingency mission. While this was not extensively explored in this 
study, the potential impact of this difference was integrated into the research data analysis 
through demographic information used as independent variables.  
Significance of the Research 
 This research is the first known effort in the Navy and SOF or in the academic 
community to assess cross-cultural competence-related attributes of Navy SEALs. 
Additionally, no other known study had cognition style factors as independent variables 
related to performance in cross-cultural competence factor assessments. The 
identification of key attributes that contribute to successful cross-cultural performance 
and a baseline profile of recent SEAL selection graduates will help establish both a 
benchmark objective (cross-cultural superior performer profile) and a “starting point” of 
SEAL cross-cultural capability (recent SEAL graduate profile). Results from this 
research can inform cross-cultural training and development initiatives, contributing to 
increased program effectiveness. Additionally, research results can assist in identifying 
critical training requirements and priorities for significant differences between SEAL 





identification of attributes associated with SEAL superior performance in a cross-cultural 
environment can assist SEAL leadership in identifying personnel best suited for 
assignment to positions requiring an ability to excel in cross-cultural environments. 
Research Questions 
In this research, I posed two primary questions: (a) Focusing on recent SEAL 
selection course graduates, what is the attribute profile, as defined by mean cohort scores, 
for SEAL selection graduates and how does this profile compare with the profile of an 
experienced SEAL cross-cultural high performer, defined as the top 15th percentile? (In 
other words, how do newly minted SEALs stack up against the experienced SEALs who 
score in the top 15th percentile in cross-cultural competence?); and (b) Focusing on 
experienced SEALs, what are the attribute profiles of cross-cultural superior (top 15th 
percentile) and substandard assessment scorers (bottom 15th percentile), and what is the 
relationship between demographic and cognition style factors and individual scores in a 
cross-cultural competence? In other words, what does the top and bottom scorers look 
like? Are there distinguishing personal traits that contribute to this performance?  
Research Design 
In this section, I review the research methodology, instruments, and procedures 
used to assess factors related to cross-cultural competence and cognition styles.  
Research Methodology 
A quantitative research design was used to explore common attributes among 
recent SEAL selection course graduates and common attributes among experienced 
SEALs who are superior or substandard assessment scorers, relative to scores across the 





each area of focus: (a) recent SEAL selection graduates and (b) experienced SEALS. 
Throughout, I used post-event observation through an identical battery of assessment 
instruments discussed in the following sections.  
Research Instruments  
Two web-based self-assessment instruments and a demographic survey were 
administered online for both studies. These instruments were given to all recent SEAL 
training graduates and a subset of recently redeployed, experienced SEALs. To ensure 
confidentiality, a unique identifier code was assigned to each participant and applied to 
each of the instruments to protect the identities of participants.  
An additional instrument designed to identify superior and substandard cross-
cultural assessment scorers was used in the cross-cultural study on experienced SEALs. 
However, this methodology was flawed and did not render useful results. The instrument 
was intended to identify superior and substandard assessment scorers in the study 
population; most SEALs identified by their peers as superior and substandard assessment 
scorers did not participate in the study. Although 157 individuals were identified as 
superior or substandard cross-cultural assessment scorers, only eight were study 
participants. Because of this design flaw, instead of using peer assessments, superior and 
substandard assessment scorers were identified using cross-cultural competence and 
cognition style factors scores. For each factor, those who scored in the top 15th percentile 
were deemed superior assessment scorers, and those scoring in the bottom 15th percentile 






 There were two instruments common across both the SEAL selection and the 
experienced SEAL studies. These instruments include cross-cultural competence factors 
and decision style factors.  
Cross-cultural competence factors. The factors of cross-cultural competence are 
depicted on the radar chart in Figure 3.1. The C3 factors used in this research are drawn 
from three studies: McCloskey et al. (2012); Ross, Thornson, et al. (2010); and Sudduth 
(2012). The instrument included 86 total items across 11 subscales focused on cross-
cultural competence plus a lie scale. The average completion time for this scale was 
approximately one hour. The lie scale is a 5-item subscale from Ross, Thornson, et al. 
(2010). The lie scale was developed to detect attempts by respondents to present 
themselves in a favorable light regardless of accuracy. Respondents who attempt to 
present themselves in the most positive way, even if untruthful, score high on the lie 
scale. Participants who failed the lie scale criteria (a total score of 15 across the five items 
on a 1 to 6 rating scale), as per Webster and Kruglanski (1994), were excluded from the 
study. The cross-cultural competence assessment used in this research is found in 
Appendix B. 
Five subscales were drawn from McCloskey et al. (2012) and included a total of 
44 items with an overall reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of .91. Adequate reliability is 








Figure 3.1. Cross-cultural competence factors—maximum and minimum scores. 
 
The first of these subscales, cultural interest, involves a military member’s 
willingness to learn about and engage with the local populace in pursuit of mission 
success (McCloskey et al., 2012). This subscale maps to the DLO framework supporting 
enablers of tolerance of cultural uncertainty, tolerance for ambiguity, openness to 
experience, and willingness to engage. This subscale of six items has a Cronbach’s alpha 
of .73.  
Cultural relativism refers to an ability to recognize and accept cultural differences 
and the corresponding alternative approaches and responses that different cultures 
engender (McCloskey et al., 2012). This subscale maps to the DLO framework 
supporting enablers of emotional stability, tolerance for uncertainty, and openness to 
experience. This subscale has 10 items and a Cronbach’s alpha of .80. 
Cultural acuity involves the ability to accurately assess the perspectives of others, 
situational dynamics, and the impact of cultural actions on the broader mission 

































perspective taking, reasoning, and learning in the DLO framework. It consists of eight 
items and has a Cronbach’s alpha of .70.  
Relationship orientation measures the general tendency to value personal 
relationships and maps to the framework’s elements of emotional stability (self-
regulation) and perspective taking (McCloskey et al., 2012). This subscale has seven 
items and a Cronbach’s alpha of .71. 
Interpersonal skills focus on the ability to “consistently present oneself in a 
manner that promotes positive short and long term interactions to achieve mission 
objectives” (McCloskey et al., 2012, p. 14) and is primarily mapped to the framework’s 
core competency of intercultural interaction. This subscale has 13 items and a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .87. 
The next five subscales are from Sudduth (2012) who did not report Cronbach’s 
alpha for subscales. The first one, stress resilience (Sudduth, 2012), represents the ability 
to tolerate emotionally exhausting, frustrating, or shocking circumstances. Resilience is 
an enabler to the core competence of self-regulation in the DLO cross-cultural 
competence framework. Those with high stress resilience, despite repeated setbacks, 
failures, and obstacles to success, can maintain task focus and enthusiasm. This subscale 
has six items. 
Inclusiveness, an enabler to core competence of cultural reasoning in the DLO 
framework, is the tendency to accept and include people and things based on 






Inquisitiveness is a 6-item subscale focused on the “tendency to take an active 
pursuit in the understanding of ideas, values, norms, situations, and behaviors that are 
new and different” (Sudduth, 2012, p. 1). It is measured using a social curiosity scale 
(Renner, 2006). Inquisitiveness is found in the DLO framework as an enabler to cultural 
learning, one of the six core competences.  
Optimism is the “expectation of positive outcomes. An individual high in 
optimism views problems as solvable challenges and as exciting learning opportunities” 
(Sudduth, 2012, p. 1). Optimism was included as a core enabler in the resilience factors 
from Johnston et al. (2010) cross-cultural framework. This subscale has six items. 
Suspending judgment is the ability to withhold judgment until adequate 
information becomes available and to perceive information neutrally (Sudduth, 2012). 
Suspending judgment was also included in the Johnston et al. (2010) framework. This 
subscale has five items and was adapted from a scale to measure professional skepticism 
(Hurtt, 2010). 
The final two subscales are from Ross, Thornson, et al. (2010). The first one, self-
efficacy, is the belief one has the ability to reach a particular goal or the power to produce 
a desired effect. Bandura’s (1997) focus on self-efficacy and his social cognitive theory is 
foundational to this concept. Self-efficacy is the only enabler to map to five of the six 
core competencies in the latest DLO framework (Reid, Kaloydis, et al., 2012). This 
subscale (Ross, Thronson, et al., 2010) has eight items and a Cronbach’s alpha of .86.  
Cognition style factors. Cognition style factors are depicted in Figure 3.2. 
Thompson (1998) developed a cognitive style assessment that included subscales from 





assessment took approximately 45 minutes to complete. The cognitive style assessment 
used in this research is found in Appendix C. As discussed in Chapter 2, cognition style 
factors are seen as enablers to cross-cultural competence (Abbe et al., 2007; Johnston et  
al., 2010; Reid, Kaloydis, et al., 2012). However, except for this study, there are no 
known studies that attempt to correlate cognition style factors with cross-cultural 
competence. 
 
Figure 3.2. Cognition style factors maximum and minimum scores. 
 
The first subscale, personal need for structure, is negatively correlated with 
integrative complexity, which affects cross-cultural competence (Tadmore et al., 2009). 
Personal need for structure is a “need to have some guiding knowledge or answer on a 
topic; any answer being preferable to no answer at all” (Thompson, Naccarato, & Parker, 
1998, p. 2). A person high in personal need for structure would be troubled and 
uncomfortable with ambiguity and grey areas and would prefer clarity and structure in 
most situations. Neuberg and Newsom (1993) demonstrated individuals high in personal 



















less complex ways. This subscale has 12 items and had a Cronbach’s alpha ranging from 
.77 to .82 across the 12 items. 
Personal fear of invalidity raises concerns with the possibility of making errors, 
potentially leading to vacillation between options, longer response times, and lower 
subjective confidence in their own judgments (Thompson et al., 1998). This subscale has 
14 items and a Cronbach’s alpha between .76 and .83 across the 14 items. 
 Need for cognition indicates enjoyment and a desire for effortful cognitive tasks; 
those with high need for cognition see difficult cognitive tasks as a challenge rather than 
stressful events (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). At face value, Thompson’s (1998) description 
of need for cognition appears to be an important factor in cross-cultural competence, and 
my data analysis described in Chapter 4 highlights a strong correlation of need for 
cognition to every cross-cultural competence factor. According to Thompson (1998):  
High need for cognition motivates [NFC] people to search for meaningful 
synthesis of decision-relevant information, with a goal of reconciling apparent 
inconsistencies into a meaningful and overarching understanding of a problem or 
issue. Past research . . . has determined that high [NFC] is related to individuals 
perceiving themselves as effective problem solvers, having higher levels of 
curiosity, and generating more complex explanations for behavior. . . . Taken 
together, this literature suggests that those high in NFC typically endeavor to 
work through, understand, and bring coherence to a decision area. (p. 3) 
 
This subscale has 18 items and a Cronbach’s alpha between .83 and .94 across the 18 
items in the various populations from Thompson’s (1998) study. 
Rigidity is a dogged persistence in responses that, while perhaps suitable in other 
contexts, no longer appear to be adequate to achieve desired goals or solve current 
problems (Wesley, 1953). Those high in rigidity likely will be unable to adapt to new or 





inconsistencies. This subscale has 22 items and a Cronbach’s alpha between .58 and .73 
across the 22 items for the various populations of Thompson’s (1998) study. 
Common Instrument Procedures 
All the instruments were web based and delivered online. The instruments could 
be taken in any order and each assessment took no more than 1 hour. The combined time 
of all instruments was less than 2 hours. It was not required that all instruments be taken 
at the same time. As long as the respondents had not had significant transitions into news 
role that might have altered their perceptions of themselves, their teammates, or their 
deployments, it is unlikely that an individual’s scores would change over a period of 
weeks. No respondents in this study had significant post-deployment transitions; upon 
return from deployment, SEAL platoon members take leave (e.g., vacation) and begin 
individual professional development courses. 
Common Data Analysis Procedures  
Instruments did not allow questions to be skipped and were not considered 
complete unless all questions were answered. A 100% response was required. If only one 
of the two instruments were completed, follow-up with individual respondents were made 
to encourage completion. When follow-up failed to affect the completion of both 
instruments, the data from the sole instrument completed was used for cohort profiles and 
correlation of the instrument variables and cross-cultural assessment performance.  
SEAL Selection Course Study 
The first research question was: What is the common attribute profile for recent 
SEAL selection graduates? This provided the starting point of the study. The independent 





successful graduation. Distribution (mean) analysis was used to determine the cohort 
attribute profile.  
Population and Sample 
I included the entire BUD/S training graduation population from August 2013 to 
June 2014; this included BUD/S Classes 300 to 305 (six classes). The first three classes, 
BUD/S classes 300 through 302, had already completed BUD/S but were assigned to 
SEAL Qualification Training (SQT), a “finishing school,” and were still available as a 
class to complete the assessments. The BUD/S classes have approximately 125 students 
who start each class; between 30 and 50 of those students graduate. The attrition rate over 
the past nine classes (Classes 294-303) was 64% (L. Jung, personal communication, 
2015). During the period of study, six classes finished training with approximately 180 
graduating; this was the population who were administered the instruments.  
One hundred and sixty-four newly participated SEALs constituted the final 
sample of this study. While 100% of the SEAL graduates (a total of 180) participated in 
the study, 30 were removed from the study for failure to meet the lie scale criteria—a 
total score less than 15 across the five items on a 1-6 scale for each item. An additional 
four recent graduates were eliminated from the study for failure to complete portions of 
the study. Therefore, the sample included 164 newly minted SEALs out of a total 
population of 180 (81%).  
Instrument Procedures 
The links to the three instruments (biographical, cognition styles, and cross-
cultural competence) and instructions were emailed to the class leader (senior student 





class and was the point of coordination for any follow-up with class members on 
incomplete elements of the instruments. It was explained participation was voluntary, but, 
given any task, a SEAL class is driven to complete it in due order.  
The SEAL selection candidates took a biographical survey and cross-cultural 
competence and cognitive style assessments as part of their administrative week prior to 
graduation. For Classes 300 through 302, already graduated, the instruments were 
completed whenever possible during their SQT. 
Data Analysis  
The regression model for data analysis in the first study involved common 
characteristics among SEAL selection course graduates and was represented as follows: 




SG = SEAL Graduate (yes or no) 
 
A1 = demographic data 
 
A23CA = Cross-Cultural Competence Assessment 
 
Where A33CA = Cultural Interest + Cultural Relativism + Cultural Acuity + Relationship 
Orientation + Interpersonal Skills + Stress Resilience + Inclusiveness + Inquisitiveness + 
Optimism + Suspending Judgment + Self-Efficacy 
 
A3CFA = Cognitive Factors Assessment 
Where A4CFA = Personal Need for Structure + Personal Fear of Invalidity + Need for 
Cognition + Rigidity 
 
The SQT students, the “finishing school,” and BUD/S graduates were combined 
to form the population of selection and assessment graduates. The SQT students (Classes 
299 to 302) and BUD/S graduates (Classes 302 to 305) were also analyzed separately and 





Experienced SEAL Study 
The second research question was: Focusing on experienced SEALs, what are the 
attribute profiles of cross-cultural superior (top 15th percentile) and substandard 
assessment scorers (bottom 15th percentile), and what is the relationship between 
demographic and cognition style factors and individual scores in a cross-cultural 
competence? In other words, what does the top and bottom scorers look like? Are there 
distinguishing personal traits that contribute to this performance? These questions 
provided the starting point of the second study. The unit of analysis was individual 
performance in a cross-cultural competence assessment. The discriminating variable was 
performance in the assessment, specifically performance in the top and bottom 15th 
percentiles. 
Distribution analysis was used to determine the cut-off scores for superior and 
substandard assessment scorers. Cut-off scores for each factor of cross-cultural 
competence and cognition style were considered attribute profiles for superior and 
substandard assessment scorers. With this information, comparisons were made between 
mean attribute profiles of newly minted SEALs and experienced SEAL superior 
assessment scorers. This answered the second part of Research Question 1: How do 
newly minted SEALs compare with experienced SEAL superior cross-cultural 
competence assessment scorers?  
The cut-off scores for superior and substandard assessment scorers were applied 
to the entire population of the study—both newly minted and experienced SEALs. 
Participants who scored at or above the top 15th percentile were assigned a 1 and 





assigned a 0 and designated as dogs, because the term “dogging it” refers to those who 
lag behind in runs or physical evolutions. A comparison of superior and substandard 
assessment scorers across the entire research population answered the first part of 
Research Question 2: What does the top and bottom of the stack look like? The 
designation of all-stars and dogs was the focal point of binary logistical regression and 
helped answer the second part of Research Question 2: Are there distinguishing personal 
traits that contribute to this performance?  
The dependent variables were individual scores in the cross-cultural competence 
assessment. The independent variables were the results of the cognition style assessment 
and demographic survey. Binary logistical regression analysis was used to determine if 
factors from the independent variables were correlated to cross-cultural competence 
assessment performance. A significance level of p = .05 was established and checked by 
an F test (ANOVA) for overall fit.  
Population 
 The particular focus of the second study (cross-cultural competence assessment 
performance) was on SEALs at the lowest echelon, the SEAL platoon; this task element 
has the greatest opportunity for cross-cultural interaction. The target population of this 
study was defined as all U.S. Navy SEALs assigned to SEAL platoons. There are eight 
SEAL teams in the U.S. Navy. Each SEAL team has seven platoons. A platoon consists 
of 21 men: three officers and 18 enlisted personnel. The target population of this study 






The total population during the research window was 588 platoon members from 
28 platoons. This number includes all SEAL platoon members returning from 
deployment between December 2013 to April 2014. Four SEAL teams returned from 
deployment during the study period. As such, the target population was 50% of the total 
population. A total of 294 experienced SEALs were in the target population, and 89 
experienced SEALs constituted the final study sample. The sample constitutes 30% (89 
of 294) of the target population and 15% (89 of 588) of the total population.  
As noted in the dissertation proposal limitations discussion, SEALs may be 
“survey saturated” as efforts to assess their post-deployment physical, mental, and social 
(family and close relationships) health have significantly increased over the period of war 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. This saturation likely reduced the response rate. To counteract 
this, I personally briefed returning SEAL teams and frequently engaged with the team 
executive officer (second in charge) in an attempt to increase response rates. As seen in 
the first study of newly graduated SEALs, assessment and selection graduates do not 
suffer from similar survey saturation and had a high response rate as they tend to be eager 
to please as the “newly minted SEALs.”  
Instrument Procedures 
The SEAL team executive officers (XOs) were emailed the link to the 
demographic questionnaire (see Appendix D) and the two assessment instruments (cross-
cultural and cognitive factors) within 2 months of their return from deployment. The XOs 





routinely engaged with the XOs and visited the teams to explain the purpose and 
importance of the study.  
As previously discussed, all platoon members were asked to rate their peers in 
cross-cultural competence using a peer rating process from McCloskey et al. (2012; see 
Appendix E). A total of 169 nominations were received, identifying 151 individuals as 
superior or substandard assessment scorers. However, of the 151 individual nominations, 
only eight participated in the study. Because of this, the top and bottom 15th percentiles 
were used as discriminators of performance. 
Data Analysis 
Regression models for data analysis in the second study involved common 
characteristics among superior and substandard assessment scorers in cross-cultural 
environments and were represented as follows: 
CCS = a0 + a1 A1 + a2A23CA + a3A3CFA 
 




CCS = Superior Cross-Cultural Assessment scorers = 1 
 
CCP = Poor Cross-Cultural Assessment scorers = 0 
 
A1 = Demographics (see Appendix D) 
 
A23CA = Cross-Cultural Competence Assessment 
Where A43CA = Cultural Interest + Cultural Relativism + Cultural Acuity + Relationship 
Orientation + Interpersonal Skills + Stress Resilience + Inclusiveness + Inquisitiveness + 
Optimism + Suspending Judgment + Self-Efficacy 
 
A3CFA = Cognitive Factors Assessment 
Where A4CFA = Personal Need for Structure + Personal Fear of Invalidity + Need for 






Limitations of the Research 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, culture and the competence required to cross cultures 
are complex constructs and difficult to precisely define and assess. Gabrenya, Griffith, et 
al. (2012) reviewed 34 instruments used to assess cross-cultural competence in 
nonmilitary contexts and found both the competency models that provided the foundation 
for the instruments and the instruments themselves wanting. The assessments used in this 
study, designed for a military context, suffered from the limitations that Gabrenya, 
Griffith, et al. (2012) highlighted: I used self-report methods to obtain declarative, 
cognitively accessible, and self-referent information, which can be misrepresented. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, I used a lie scale meant to address this limitation. The lie scale 
assessment identified 30 recently graduated SEALs (and no experienced SEALs) as 
potentially “faking it”; these individuals were removed from the study. Regardless, the 
potential for respondent manipulation of the results still existed.  
 No cross-cultural assessment has been independently correlated with cross-
cultural performance. While previous academic research has included the creation of the 
original feeder instruments, there are no independent studies that correlate the assessment 
instruments in the field of cross-cultural performance. My research has a theoretical 
foundation that has not been scrutinized by researchers assessing actual cross-cultural 
competence assessment scorers; due to the shortfall in peer assessments this was a 








This research focused on the relatively small community of U.S. Navy SEALs 
and the attributes of individual SEALs that may be correlated to performance in cross-
cultural assessment, a proxy for when SEALs work with foreign partners. This research is 
about cross-cultural competence factors at an individual level of analysis. My goal was to 
discover if there is a correlation between demographic traits or cognition style factors and 
scores assessing individual cross-cultural competence factors. 
This chapter begins with a review of the study population demographics, attribute 
profiles, and details of the regression analysis. Attribute profiles, consisting of mean 
scores in both the cognition style and cross-cultural competence factors, are used to 
compare (a) new SEALs and experienced SEALs, (b) new SEALs and the top 15th 
percentile of experienced SEALs (as a performance benchmark), and (c) officer and 
enlisted SEALs. These comparisons highlight potential areas of training and development 
focus. I also compare the attribute profiles of the entire study population in the top 15th 
percentile (the superior assessment scorers) and the bottom 15th percentile (the 
substandard assessment scorers). This is used in binary logistical regression analysis as 
dependent variables where 1 = all-stars and 0 = dogs. 
Demographic and cognition style factors were used as independent variables. 
Highly significant correlations contributed to predictive models for each of the 11 cross-
cultural competence factors. I close the chapter with a detailed summary of the data 






A total of 253 SEALs participated in this study. This number does not include 
data collected but excluded from analysis. Ten experienced SEALs completed only the 
demographic survey and did not complete any part of the decision styles or cross cultural 
competence surveys; they were thus eliminated from the study. Additionally, 30 
participants, all new graduates, were eliminated from the study because their lie scale 
scores on a scale of 1 to 6 exceeded a mean of 4; this mirrors the methodology used by 
Ross, Thornson, et al. (2010) and developed by Webster and Kruglanski (1994). It is not 
surprising that slightly more than 15% of the newly minted SEALs felt some desire to 
complete the surveys out of class loyalty and a compulsion to complete any assigned 
task, but they focused less than the necessary energy to read and digest the items or felt 
compelled to show positive faces. Alternatively, they may have been extreme narcissists, 
as items include statements such as “I have never hurt another person’s feelings” and “I 
have never been late for an appointment.” However, if this were the case, I would expect 
this narcissist flag to be reflected in at least some of the experienced SEALs. 
Survey Methodology 
Two web-based, self-assessment instruments, totaling 153 individual questions, 
and a demographic survey were administered online to six classes of newly minted 
SEALs and experienced SEALs from a subset of four SEAL teams recently returned 
from deployment. The total time for completing the assessments for each participant was 





Experience, Age, Rank, and Time in Service  
Study participants included 164 (64.8%) newly graduated SEALs and 89 (35.2%) 
experienced SEALs. One variable, SEAL experience, correlated to one cross-cultural 
competence factor, suspending judgment. This correlation will be discussed later in the 
chapter. Except for this instance, SEAL experience was not found to correlate to 
cognition styles factors or any other cross-cultural competence factor.  
While it may seem participants of this study skew young, the mean age across all 
SOF was 29 (USSOCOM, 2019), and SEALs are generally younger than their Army 
counterparts. Consistent with nearly 65% of participants being newly minted SEALs, 
68.5% were in their twenties (see Figure 4.1). In terms of rank, 65.6% were in the lowest 
officer and enlisted ranks: Ensigns (O-1) or Lieutenant Junior Grade (O-2) and Seaman 
Recruit (E-1) to Petty Officer Third Class (E-4; see Figure 4.2). More than 60% (62.1%) 
were in their first 4 years of service with an additional 16.2% serving between 5-8 years 
(see Figure 4.3). Neither age, rank, nor time in service was correlated to decision styles or 
cross-cultural competence factors.  
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Figure 4.2. Rank distribution across the study participants. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Time in service distribution across the study participants. 
 
As depicted in Figure 4.4, 99 (39.1%) officers and 153 (60.5%) enlisted SEALs 
were among participants. Being an officer was found to correlate to the suspending 
judgment factor of cross-cultural competence and will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Neither status as an officer nor enlisted service member was found to correlate to 
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Figure 4.4. Officer and enlisted distribution across the study sample. 
 
Language and Cultural Training.  
A majority (59.7%) of participants had less than 1 week of cultural training, and 
21% had 2-8 weeks of cultural training. An even larger majority (64.4%) had no language 
training, while fewer than 20% had extended language training (9 or more weeks). The 
distribution of study by cultural and language training is shown in Figure 4.5. 
About half (50.7%) of participants assessed their cultural training as effective 
(moderate to highly effective), and 30% assessed their cultural training as minimally 
effective or not at all effective. Cultural training was assessed to be more effective than 
language training. Only 17.4% of participants assessed their language training to be 
effective (moderate to very highly effective), where 41.1% assessed language training as 
minimally effective or ineffective. These results are shown in Figure 4.6. Neither cultural 
nor language training was found to be correlated to decision style or cross-cultural 

















Figure 4.5. Effectiveness of cultural and language training assessed by study participants. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Distribution of participants by cultural awareness and language training 
across study sample. 
 
Deployment Experience  
Nearly three-fourths (72.5%) of experienced SEALs had two or three 
deployments, while 16% had only one deployment; the rest had four or more 
deployments (see Figure 4.7). On their most recent deployments, nearly 60% of 
participants completed routine SEAL deployments of 6-8 months; another third 
completed short deployments of less than 6 months, and almost 10% completed extended 
deployments of more than 8 months (see Figure 4.8). There were no reported losses 




































losses. Neither number of deployments, length of most recent deployments, nor partner 
force losses were correlated with cognition styles or cross cultural-competence factors.  
 
Figure 4.7. Distribution of deployment experience across study participants. 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Length of most recent deployment across study participants. 
 
Experienced SEALs were nearly evenly distributed across the spectrum of task 
element sizes (see Figure 4.9). Slightly more than 18% were operating in elements of four 
personnel or less, while 12% were operating in squad sizes of seven to 10 personnel, and 
14.5% were in elements of 11 to 16 personnel. Nearly 23% were operating in SEAL 
platoon strengths of 16 to 21 personnel, and slightly more than 25% were operating in 
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Figure 4.9. Distribution of study participants most recent deployment task element size. 
 
A summary of deployment locations is shown in Figure 4.10. Most of experienced 
SEALs were deployed to the Middle East, including Afghanistan (61.4%), while the rest 
were distributed to the Southern Command (3.6%), European Command (3.6%), Pacific  
Command (14.5%) and Africa Command (16.9%). Neither size of task element nor 
deployment location was correlated to decision styles or cross-cultural competence 
factors. 
 


























Most of the experienced SEALs (61.4%) were assigned missions related to 
training and advising partner forces. As a result, 83.2% reported moderate to significant 
contact with their partners, with 68% having daily contact with their partners. See Figures 
4.11 and 4.12 for individual and task element interaction with partner forces.  
 
Figure 4.11. Individual interaction with partner forces. 
 
 
Figure 4.12. Task element contact with partner forces. 
 
Nearly three fourths (74.7%) of experienced SEALs assessed their task element 
effectiveness in interactions as moderate to extremely effective, while 22.9% reported 
mixed results, and only 2.4% reported poor results (see Figure 4.13). Neither the type of 
mission, degree of partner contact, nor the assessed effectiveness of partner nation forces 























Figure 4.13. Assessed effectiveness of task elements crossing cultures. 
 
Cross-Cultural Competence Attribute Profile 
The attribute profiles in this research include cognition style factors and cross-
cultural competence factors. I have used radar charts to portray the mean scores of 
cognition style and cross-cultural competence factors.  
Cognition Style Factors 
The independent variables and range of responses for each cognition style factor 
are shown in Table 4.1. Each variable used a Likert scale where the minimum response 
(0) represents strongly disagree and the maximum response (6 or 8) represents strongly 
agree. The differences in ranges are based upon the origin and development of the scale 
by Thompson (1998).  
 Personal need for structure is a factor that represents the need to have some 
guiding knowledge or answer on a topic with any answer being preferable to no answer at 
all. This instrument contained 12 items that comprise this factor. In an ambiguous 



















Ranges for Independent Variables – Cognition Style Factors 
 
Independent Variables Range 
Personal Need for Structure 0-6 
Need for Cognition 0-8 
Rigidity 0-6 
Personal Fear of Invalidity 0-6 
 
Need for cognition is a factor that indicates enjoyment and a desire for effortful 
cognitive tasks. Those high in need for cognition see difficult cognitive task as a 
challenge rather than a stressful event. Eighteen items comprised this factor in this 
instrument. The higher the score, the better, although those high in need for cognition are 
sometimes slow to make decisions or bog down collaborative conversations in excessive 
discussion of the facts (Petty, Brinol, Loersch, & McCaslin, 2009).  
Rigidity represents dogged persistence in responses that, while perhaps suitable in 
other contexts, no longer appear to be adequate to achieve desired goals or solve current 
problems. Individuals high in rigidity are often unable to adapt to new or inconsistent 
information about a topic, which could lead to an inability to reconcile inconsistencies. 
This instrument contained 22 items that comprise the factor. In an ambiguous 
environment, generally, the lower the score, the better. 
Personal fear of invalidity is a factor which raises concerns with the possibility of 
making errors, potentially leading to vacillation between options, longer response times, 
and lower subjective confidence in their own judgments. This instrument contained 14 
items that comprised this factor. Generally, the lower the score, the better; however, an 





Cross-Cultural Competence Factors  
The dependent variables that comprise the cross-cultural competence factors are 
presented in Table 4.2 along with the ranges of responses on a Likert scale where the 
minimum response (0) is strongly disagree and the maximum response (6) is strongly 
agree.  
Table 4.2 
Ranges for Dependent Variables – Cross-Cultural Factors 
 
Dependent Variables Range 
Relationship Orientation 0-6 
Cultural Acuity 0-6 
Cultural Relativism 0-6 
Interpersonal Skills 0-6 
Cultural Interest 0-6 
Inquisitiveness 0-6 
Suspending Judgment 0-6 
Optimism 0-6 




The cross-cultural competence factors and definitions include the following: 
• Relationship orientation (7 items) is a factor that reflects the general tendency 
to value personal relationships.  
• Cultural acuity (8 items) represents the ability to accurately assess the 
perspectives of others, situational dynamics, and the impact of cultural actions 
on the broader mission.  
• Cultural relativism (10 items) reflects an ability to recognize and accept 
cultural differences and the corresponding alternative approaches and 





• Interpersonal skills (13 items) refer to the ability to consistently present 
oneself in a manner that promotes positive short- and long-term interactions to 
achieve mission objectives.  
• Cultural interest (six items) is a factor that assesses the willingness to learn 
about and engage with the local population in pursuit of mission success.  
• Inquisitiveness (six items) represents the tendency to take an active pursuit in 
the understanding of ideas, values, norms, situations, and behaviors that are 
new and different.  
• Suspending judgment (five items) refers to the ability to withhold judgment 
until adequate information becomes available and to perceive information 
neutrally.  
• Optimism (six items) is a factor that represents the expectation of positive 
outcomes. High scores indicate viewing problems as solvable challenges and 
as exciting learning opportunities.  
• Stress resilience (six items) represents the ability to tolerate emotionally 
exhausting, frustrating, or shocking circumstances. 
• Inclusiveness (seven items) refers to the tendency to accept and include people 
and things based on commonalities and an appreciation of differences 
• Self-efficacy (eight items) is a construct that expresses the belief that one has 
the ability to reach a particular goal or the power to produce a desired effect.  
The cross-cultural competence means of all SEALs in the study were compared 
with maximum scores on each of these factors. This comparison is shown in Figure 4.14. 





studies, and there are no comparison groups with which to compare the scores of the 
SEALS in this study. 
 
Figure 4.14. SEAL cross-cultural competence mean scores. 
 
Research Question Findings 
In this section, I present the findings as they relate to each research question, 
which were as follows:  
1. What is the attribute profile, as defined by mean cohort scores, for SEAL 
selection graduates and how does this profile compare with the profile of an 
experienced SEAL cross-cultural high performer? In other words, how do 
newly minted SEALs compare with the experienced SEALs who score in the 
top 15th percentile in cross-cultural competence? 
2. What are the attribute profiles of cross-cultural superior (top 15th percentile) 
and substandard assessment scorers (bottom 15th percentile), and what is the 
relationship between demographic and cognition style factors and individual 































bottom assessment scorers look like and do personal traits contribute to this 
performance?  
Research Question 1  
Research Question 1 focused on newly minted SEALs with a focus on how new 
SEALs common attribute profiles compare to experienced SEALs who are superior 
assessment scorers in the cross-cultural competence assessment factors, as defined by the 
top 15th percentile of scores in the instrument. This comparison was intended to inform 
potential areas of focus for education and training. The comparison of how newly minted 
SEALs compare with experienced SEALs scoring in the top 15th percentile of each 
factor is shown in Figures 4.15 and 4.16. 
 
























Figure 4.16. Cross-cultural competence factors mean comparison newly minted SEALs 
vs. experienced SEAL all-stars. 
 
In cognition style factors, the newly minted SEAL mean score is very close to 
stars in need for cognition. Again, this is the most critical cognition style factor, with 
strong correlation to all of the cross-cultural competence factors. Additionally, the newly  
minted SEAL means are close to star assessment scorers in personal need for structure 
and rigidity. There is a major difference in personal fear of invalidity between newly 
minted SEALs and stars. Experienced SEALs in the top 15th percentile registered the 
lowest possible score for personal fear of invalidity, which may raise concerns about 
hubris and overconfidence; newly minted SEAL mean scores were in the middle of the 
scale. This highlights that new SEALs are very well positioned for cross-cultural focused 
missions with strong cognition style factor scores that are correlated with top 
performance in the cross-cultural competence factors.  
In cross-cultural competence factors, newly minted SEAL means lagged behind 





























cultural acuity. The largest gap between newly minted SEAL means and stars was in 
suspending judgment.  
Strengths and weaknesses are highlighted in Table 4.3, which shows the total 
number in the top 15th percentile and the bottom 15th percentile for (a) the entire 
regression model discussed in the next section, (b) experienced SEALs, and (c) newly 
minted SEALs. The table also shows the percentages of stars and dogs in each category. 
As a reminder, the top and bottom 15th percentiles were established through the scores of 
all experienced SEALs, which sets an operational benchmark. Using this benchmark, 
newly minted SEALs were identified who fit in the top and bottom 15th percentiles as 
established by experienced SEALs. Comparing the percentage for stars and dogs (top and 
bottom 15th percentile, respectively) in each factor underscores potential areas for 
training, development, and use of new SEALs. A skew greater than 60% is noted with 
bold font for dogs and underlined italics for stars, respectively. 
Newly minted SEAL stars clustered in interpersonal skills, cultural interest, 
inquisitiveness, stress resilience, and self-efficacy. The cross-cultural competence 
strengths of newly minted SEALs (highlighted in underlined italics font), identified by a 
disproportionate number of stars—a greater than 60% skew toward stars and away from 
dogs—may indicate that newly minted SEALs, especially those with high scores in need 
for cognition, may be better positioned than the average experienced SEAL to perform 
well engaging with foreign partners. Additionally, building task elements with an eye 
toward cross-cultural competence, and not just experience, would likely improve SEAL 







Percentage of Stars and Dogs Across Cross-Cultural Competence Factors 
Note. RO = relationship orientation; CA = cultural acuity; CR = cultural relativism; IS = 
interpersonal skills; CI = cultural interest; INQ = inquisitiveness; SJ = suspending judgment; O = 
optimism; SR = stress resilience; INC = inclusiveness; SE = self-efficacy.  
Newly minted SEAL dogs were prominent (75% skew toward dogs, highlighted 
in bold font) in suspending judgment, the ability to withhold judgment until adequate 
information becomes available and to perceive information neutrally. This result may 
warrant some focused attention in SEAL training. Additionally, both newly minted seals 
(56%) and experienced SEALs (63.6%) were skewed toward dogs in inclusiveness.  
While not part of the dissertation questions, comparing attribute profiles of newly 
minted SEALs and experienced SEALs and officers and enlisted provides additional 
insight. These comparisons are presented in Figures 4.17 and 4.18.  
Cross-Cultural Competence Factors 
  RO CA CR IS CI INQ SJ O SR INC SE 
Model total 73 95 60 65 47 80 95 70 80 90 91 
Dog % 46.6 49.5 53.3 52.3 51.1 41.2 68.4 48.6 23.7 58.9 23.1 
Star % 53.4 50.5 46.7 47.7 48.9 58.8 31.6 51.4 76.3 41.1 76.9 
Salt total 23 30 26 24 23 35 30 26 27 33 25 
Dog % 43.5 53.3 53.8 50 60.9 51.4 53.3 50 44.4 63.6 52 




51 65 36 32 26 47 68 46 55 59 67 
Dog %  47.1 47.7 52.7 37.5 38.5 31.9 75 47.8 12.7 56 11.9 










Figure 4.18. Cross-cultural competence factors mean score comparison newly minted 
SEALs vs. experienced SEALs. 
 
The mean of newly minted SEALs is significantly higher than the mean of 
experienced SEALs in personal need for structure and need for cognition. However, 
newly minted SEALs have a higher personal fear of invalidity and roughly similar means 















































efficacy, stress resilience, inquisitiveness, cultural interest, and slightly higher cultural 
acuity and relationship orientation. Newly minted SEALs lagged behind experienced 
SEALs in suspending judgment. Overall, this may imply newly minted SEALs may be 
better postured to engage foreign partners or more open to the engagement. 
The final comparison of attribute profiles presented in this section is one between 
SEAL officers and enlisted. As depicted in Figures 4.19 and 4.20, there are minimal 
differences between the profiles of officers and enlisted. Officers’ means are slightly 
higher in need for structure, inclusiveness, and cultural relativism and slightly lower in 
stress resilience. The latter would come to no surprise to enlisted SEALs.  
 























Figure 4.20. Cross-cultural competence factor mean comparison officer vs. enlisted. 
 
Research Question 2  
The second primary question of this research is focused on the attribute profiles of 
superior and substandard scorers for all SEALs in the study. The attribute profiles of 
these two groups are presented in Figures 4.21 and 4.22. 
Using these two performance categories (star and dog), I used binary logistical 
analysis with cross cultural competence factors as dependent variables to explore any 
correlations between demographic or cognition style factors and cross-cultural 
competence factors. The cross-cultural competence models identify cognition style and 
































Figure 4.21. Decision style factors mean comparison stars vs. dogs. 
 
 
Figure 4.22. Cross-cultural competence factors mean comparison star vs. dog. 
 
Cross-cultural competence model. The details of the regression analysis are 
discussed later in the chapter after I present the consolidated model for cross-cultural 
competence. For 10 of the 11 cross-cultural competence factors, the model consists only 
of the four cognition style factors—need for cognition, personal fear of invalidity, 
rigidity, and personal need for structure. For interpersonal skills, the 11th cross-cultural 

















































because of their significant correlation to interpersonal skills. The ranges of predictability 
for the variability in a particular cross-cultural competence factor, as projected by the 
Cox and Snell and Nagerlkerke R squares, range from 20.1-26.9% for relationship 
orientation to 52.7-79.8% for self-efficacy. 
There were five cross-cultural competence factors where the model held only 
need for cognition as a significant factor. These results are shown in Table 4.4.  
Table 4.4  
Cross-Cultural Competence Model for Factors Where Only Need for Cognition Is 
Significant 
 
Note. RO = relationship orientation; CI = cultural interest; O = optimism; INQ = inquisitiveness; 
INC = inclusion. 
 
 For the other six cross-cultural competence factors, need for cognition combined 
with at least one other cognition style factor as significant independent variables. 
Personal fear of invalidity was significant in five of the cross-cultural competence factors 
while rigidity was significant in three cross-cultural competence factors. Personal need 
for structure was significant in only one cross-cultural competence factor. Suspending 
judgment was the only cross-cultural competence factor where demographic variables 
were found to be significant; experienced SEALs and officers were significant variables. 
These details are presented in Table 4.5. 
  
 Factors 
Model Data RO CI O INQ INC 
Cox & Snell R2 0.2 0.49 0.24 0.31 0.33 
Nagelkerke R2 0.27 0.65 0.33 0.41 0.44 
  NFC NFC NFC NFC NFC 







Cross-Cultural Competence Model Where More Than Need for Cognition Is Significant  
 
Note. SR = stress resilience; CA = cultural acuity; IS = interpersonal skills; CR = cultural 
relativism; SE = self-efficacy; SJ = suspending judgment; EXP = experienced SEALs; NFC = 
need for cognition; PFI = personal fear of invalidity; R = rigidity; PNS = personal need for 
structure. 
 
Regression analysis details. Direct logistical regression was performed to assess 
the impact of cognition style factors on the likelihood that SEALs would be in the top or  
bottom 15th percentile (1 = top 15th percentile; 0 = bottom 15th percentile) of the 
11cross-cultural competence factors. Ten of the models contained only the four cognitive 
style variables (need for closure, need for cognition, rigidity, and personal fear of 
invalidity).  
Relationship orientation. The full model containing all predictors was 
statistically significant, chi-square (4, n = 73) = 16.424, p = .002, indicating the model 
distinguished between SEALs in the top 15th percentile of relationship orientation and 
those in the bottom 15th percentile. This model on a whole explained between 20.1% and 
26.9% of the variance between SEAL super stars and substandard assessment scorers in 
 Factors 
Model Data SR CA IS CR SE SJ 
Cox & Snell R2 0.24 0.5 0.47 0.36 0.53 0.39 
Nagelkerke R2 0.32 0.67 0.63 0.48 0.8 0.51 
  NFC NFC NFC NFC NFC NFC 
Sig. 0.01 < 0.01 0.04 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
  PFI PFI PFI PFI PFI PFI 
Sig. < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.03 0.02   
  R R R R R R 
Sig.       0.03 0.01 < 0.01 
  PNS PNS PNS PNS PNS PNS 
Sig.       0.04     
           EXP 
Sig.          < 0.01 
           Officer 





the relationship orientation factor of cross-cultural competence. As shown in Table 4.6, 
only one of the four independent variables made a unique statistically significant 
contribution to the model. Need for cognition displayed an odds ratio of 2.91. This 
indicates the odds of being a super star in relationship orientation increase by a factor of 
2.91 if a person scores one point higher in need for cognition.  
Table 4.1  
 
Relationship Orientation Model Data 
 
Variable B SE Wald p 
PNS .87 .52 2.88 .09 
PFI -.43 .63 .47 .49 
NFC 1.07 .34 9.6 <.01 
Rigidity -.77 .84 .84 .36 
Constant -4.56 4.11 1.23 .27 
Note. NFC = need for cognition; PNS = personal need for structure; PFI = personal fear of 
invalidity. 
 
Cultural acuity. The full model containing all predictors was statistically 
significant, chi-square (4, n = 95) = 66.423, p = .000, indicating the model distinguished 
between SEALs in the top 15th percentile of cultural acuity and those in the bottom 15th 
percentile. This model on a whole explained between 50.3% (Cox and Snell R2) and 
67.1% of the variance between SEAL all-stars and substandard assessment scorers in the 
cultural acuity factor of cross-cultural competence. As shown in Table 4.7, two of the 
four independent variables made a unique statistically significant contribution to the 
model. Need for cognition displayed an odds ratio of 5.4. The odds of being an all-star in 
cultural acuity increased by a factor of 5.4 if a person scored one point higher in need for 
cognition. Personal fear of invalidity displayed an odds ratio of .027 (-1:37), indicating a 
negative correlation; the odds of being an all-star in cultural acuity increase by a factor of 





Table 4.2  
 
Cultural Acuity Model Data 
 
Variables B  SE Wald  p 
NFS .35 .60 .34 .56 
PFI -3.61 .87 17.33 < .01 
NFC 1.69 .50 11.40 .01 
Rigidity 1.01 1.07 .90 .34 
Constant -2.57 5.17 .25 .62 
Note. NFC = need for cognition; PNS = personal need for structure; PFI = personal fear of 
invalidity. 
 
Cultural relativism. The full model containing all predictors was statistically 
significant, chi-square (4, n = 60) = 26.748, p < .001, indicating the model distinguished 
between SEALs in the top 15th percentile of cultural relativism and those in the bottom 
15th percentile. This model on a whole explained between 36% and 48% of the variance 
between SEAL all-stars and dogs scorers in the cultural relativism factor of cross-cultural 
competence.  
As shown in Table 4.8, all four independent variables made a unique statistically 
significant contribution to the model. Cultural relativism was the only cross-cultural 
competence factor where all four cognition style factors had a correlation. Cultural 
relativism was also the only cross-cultural competence factor where need for structure 
played any role. Need for structure displayed an odds ratio of 4.79. The odds of a person 
being an all-star in cultural relativism increased by a factor of 4.79 if a person scored one 
point higher in need for structure. Need for cognition displayed an odds ratio of 3.61; the 
odds of being an all-star in cultural relativism increased by a factor of 3.61 if a person 
scored one point higher on need for cognition. Personal fear of invalidity displayed an 
odds ratio of 0.19 (-1:5.15); the odds of a person being an all-star in cultural relativism 





Rigidity displayed an odds ratio of 0.04 (-1:27.8). The odds of a person being an all-star 
in cultural relativism increase by a factor of 27.8 if a person scored one point less in 
rigidity. 
Table 4.8 
Cultural Relativism Model Data 
 
Variable B SE Wald p 
NFS 1.57 .78 4.09 .04 
PFI -1.64 .74 4.86 .03 
NFC 1.28 .42 9.31 <.01 
Rigidity -3.30 1.49 4.93 .03 
Constant 4.09 4.93 .69 .41 
Note. NFC = need for cognition; PNS = personal need for structure; PFI = personal fear of 
invalidity. 
 
Interpersonal skills. The full model containing all predictors was statistically  
significant, chi-square (4, n = 55) = 35.063, p < .001, indicating the model distinguished 
between SEALs in the top 15th percentile of interpersonal skills and those in the bottom 
15th percentile. This model on a whole explained between 47.1% and 63.2% of the 
variance between SEAL super stars and substandard assessment scorers in the 
interpersonal skills factor of cross-cultural competence. As shown in Table 4.9, two of 
the four independent variables made a unique statistically significant contribution to the 
model. Need for cognition displayed an odds ratio of 3.26. The odds of a person being an 
all-star in interpersonal skills increase by a factor of 3.26 if a person scored one point 
higher in need for cognition. Personal fear of invalidity displayed an odds ratio of .017 (-
1:58.8). The odds of being an all-star in interpersonal skills increase by a factor of 58.8 if 








Interpersonal Skills Model Data 
 
Variable B SE Wald p 
PNS .52 .83 .39 .53 
PFI -4.10 1.44 8.14 <.01 
NFC 1.18 .57 4.29 .04 
Rigidity  .09 1.42 .00 .95 
Constant 4.70 7.40 .41 .53 
Note. NFC = need for cognition; PNS = personal need for structure; PFI = personal fear of 
invalidity.  
 
Cultural interest. The full model containing all predictors was statistically 
significant, chi-square (4, n = 47) = 31.62, p < .001, indicating the model distinguished 
between SEALs in the top 15th percentile of cultural interest and those in the bottom 15th 
percentile. This model on a whole explained between 49% and 65.3% of the variance 
between SEAL super stars and substandard assessment scorers in the cultural interest 
factor of cross-cultural competence. As shown in Table 4.10, only one of the four 
independent variables made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model. 
Need for cognition displayed an odds ratio of 8.56. The odds of being an all-star in 
cultural interest increased by a factor of 8.56 if a person scored one point higher in need 
for cognition.  
Table 4.10 
 
Cultural Interest Model Data 
 
Variable B SE Wald p 
PNS .26 .71 .14 .71 
PFI 1.43 .91 2.49 .12 
NFC 2.11 .72 8.61 <.01 
Rigidity 2.14 2.22 .93 .34 
Constant -15.21 10.62 2.05 .15 






Inquisitiveness. The full model containing all predictors was statistically 
significant, chi-square (4, n = 80) = 29.374, p < .001, indicating the model distinguished 
between SEALs in the top 15th percentile of inquisitiveness and those in the bottom 15th 
percentile. This model on a whole explained between 30.7% and 41.4% of the variance 
between SEAL super stars and substandard assessment scorers in the inquisitiveness  
factor of cross-cultural competence. As shown in Table 4.11, only one of the four 
independent variables made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model. 
Need for cognition displayed an odds ratio of 4.37. The odds of being an all-star in 
inquisitiveness increased by a factor of 4.37 if a person scored one point higher in need 
for cognition. 
Table 4.3  
 
Inquisitiveness Model Data 
 
Variable B SE Wald p 
PNS .09 .59 .03 .87 
PFI -.49 .62 .62 .43 
NFC 1.47 .42 12.07 <.01 
Rigidity .67 1.04 .41 .52 
Constant -8.67 4.58 3.59 .06 
Note. NFC = need for cognition; PNS = personal need for structure; PFI = personal fear of 
invalidity. 
 
 Optimism. The full model containing all predictors was statistically significant, 
chi-square (4, n = 70) = 19.57, p = .001, indicating the model distinguished between 
SEALs in the top 15th percentile of optimism and those in the bottom 15th percentile. 
This model on a whole between 24.4% and 32.5% of the variance between SEAL all-
stars and substandard assessment scorers in the optimism factor of cross-cultural 
competence. As shown in Table 4.12, only one of the four independent variables made a 





odds ratio of 2.40. The odds of being an all-star in optimism increased by a factor of 2.40 
if a person scored one point higher in need for cognition. 
Table 4.12 
 
Optimism Model Data 
 
Variable B SE Wald p 
PNS -.13 .50 .07 .80 
PFI -.98 .58 2.89 .09 
NFC .88 .39 4.97 .03 
Rigidity .42 .83 .26 .61 
Constant -2.88 4.26 .46 .50 
Note. NFC = need for cognition; PNS = personal need for structure; PFI = personal fear of 
invalidity. 
 
Stress resilience. The full model containing all predictors was statistically 
significant, chi-square (4, n = 80) = 19.570, p = .001, indicating the model distinguished 
between SEALs in the top 15th percentile of stress resilience and those in the bottom 
15th percentile. This model on a whole explained between 24.4% and 32.5% of the 
variance between SEAL super stars and substandard assessment scorers in the stress 
resilience factor of cross-cultural competence. As shown in Table 4.13, two of the four 
independent variables made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model. 
Need for cognition displayed an odds ratio of 11.32. The odds of a person being a star in 
stress resilience increased by a factor of 11.32 if a person scored one point higher in need 
for cognition. Personal fear of invalidity displayed an odds ratio of .02, indicating a 
negative correlation; the odds of a person being an all-star in stress resilience increased 









Stress Resilience Model Data 
 
Variable B SE Wald p 
NFS 1.62 .84 3.70 .05 
PFI -4.17 1.42 8.55 <.01 
NFC 2.43 .89 7.46 .01 
Rigidity 2.36 1.66 2.03 .16 
Constant -.41 7.36 .00 .96 
Note. NFC = need for cognition; PNS = personal need for structure; PFI = personal fear of 
invalidity. 
 
Inclusiveness. The full model containing all predictors was statistically 
significant, chi-square (4, n = 90) = 35.477, p < .001, indicating the model distinguished 
between SEALs in the top 15th percentile of inclusiveness and those in the bottom 15th 
percentile. This model on a whole explained between 32.6% and 43.9% of the variance 
between SEAL all-stars and substandard assessment scorers in the inclusiveness factor of 
cross-cultural competence. As shown in Table 4.14, only one of the four independent 
variables made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model. Need for 
cognition displayed an odds ratio of 5.74. The odds of a person being an all-star in 




Inclusiveness Model Data 
 
Variable B SE Wald p 
PNS -.14 .49 .08 .78 
PFI .41 .63 .43 .51 
NFC 1.75 .41 18.66 <.01 
Rigidity -.38 .90 .18 .67 
Constant -9.31 4.22 4.87 .03 







Self-efficacy. The full model containing all predictors was statistically significant, 
chi-square (4, n = 91) = 68.1, p < .001, indicating the model distinguished between 
SEALs in the top 15th percentile of self-efficacy and those in the bottom 15th percentile. 
This model on a whole explained between 52.7% and 79.8% of the variance between 
SEAL super stars and substandard assessment scorers in the self-efficacy factor of cross-
cultural competence. As shown in Table 4.15, three of the four independent variables 
made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model. Need for cognition 
displayed an odds ratio of 69.97. The odds of being an all-star in self-efficacy increased 
by a factor of 70 if a person scored one point higher in need for cognition. Personal fear 
of invalidity displayed an odds ratio of 0.02. The odds of being an all-star in self-efficacy 
increased by a factor of 59 if a person scored one point lower in personal fear of 
invalidity. Rigidity displayed an odds ratio of 600.19. The odds of a person being an all-




Self-Efficacy Model Data 
 
Variable B SE Wald p 
PNS -1.13 .98 1.37 .25 
PFI -4.09 1.80 5.18 .02 
NFC NFC  4.25 1.25 
Rigidity 6.40 2.32 7.59 .01 
Constant -26.01 10.94 5.65 .02 
Note. NFC = need for cognition; PNS = personal need for structure; PFI = personal fear of 
invalidity. 
 
Suspending judgment. Direct logistical regression was performed to assess the 
impact of cognitive style factors on the likelihood that SEALs would be in the top 15th 





competence factor suspending judgment. In addition to the four cognitive style variables 
contained in the 10 other cross-cultural competence factor models, this model included 
two demographic variables, experienced SEALs and SEAL officers. The full model 
containing all predictors was statistically significant, chi-square (4, n = 95) = 47.4, p < 
.001, indicating the model distinguished between SEALs in the top 15th percentile of 
suspending judgment and those in the bottom 15th percentile (see Figure 4.16). This 
model on a whole explained between 39.3% and 50.1% of the variance between SEAL 
super stars and substandard assessment scorers in the suspending judgment factor of 
cross-cultural competence.  
As shown in Table 4.16, two of the four cognitive style independent variables 
made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model. Need for cognition 
displayed an odds ratio of 4.59. The odds of being an all-star in suspending judgment 
increased by a factor of 4.59 if a person scored one point higher in need for cognition. 
Rigidity displayed an odds ratio of 35.87. The odds of being an all-star in suspending 
judgment increased by a factor of 35.87 if a person scored one point higher in rigidity.  
Table 4.16 
 
Suspending Judgment Model Data 
 
Variables B SE Wald p 
NFC 1.52 .43 12.55 <.01 
RIGIDITY 3.58 1.35 7.09 .01 
PNS .49 .57 .74 .39 
PFI .49 .57 .73 .39 
EXP -2.25 .78 8.39 <.01 
Officer  1.84 .75 6.04 .01 
Constant -24.63 5.86 17.66 <.01 







The two demographic variables were also found to make a unique statistically 
significant contribution to the model. Experienced SEALs displayed an odds ratio of 
.023. The odds of being an all-star in suspending judgment increased by a factor of 43.47 
if a SEAL is a newly minted SEAL. Officers displayed an odds ratio of 6.28. The odds of 
being an all-star in suspending judgment increased by a factor of 6.3 if a SEAL is an 
officer, rather than an enlisted. 
The Story in the Data 
I am aware of no other study that has assessed a cognition styles model for 
correlation with cross-cultural competence. I pursued this avenue of study because I was 
interested in the importance of integrative complexity—the capacity and willingness to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of competing perspectives on the same issue (differentiation) 
and to forge conceptual links among these perspectives (Seudfeld, Tetlock, & Strefert, 
1992). Tadmore et al. (2009) placed integrative complexity into the context of cross-
cultural competence: 
Within a cross-cultural context, integrative complexity reflects the degree to 
which people accept the reasonableness of clashing cultural perspectives on how 
to live and, consequently, the degree to which they are motivated to develop 
cognitive schemas that integrate these competing world views by explaining how 
different people can come to such divergent conclusions or by specifying ways of 
blending potentially discordant norms and values. (p. 106) 
 
Because assessment of integrative complexity is onerous and time consuming for 
study participants, cognition styles were used as a proxy. Personal need for structure has 
been shown to negatively correlate to integrative complexity. Need for cognitive closure 
has also been shown to negatively correlate to integrative complexity. Furthermore, need 
for cognitive closure and need for cognition are closely related (Suedfeld, 2009). The 





rigidity, and personal fear of invalidity—were used by Thompson (1998) and applied in a 
study using Canadian military forces and University of Arizona students.  
Using binary logistical regression analysis against the dependent variable of 
superior and substandard assessment scorers, I developed predictive models for the 11 
cross-cultural competence factors. Ten of 11 of the predictive models used only the four 
cognition style factors and in all but one case were found to be worthwhile models with 
highly significant goodness of fit, as demonstrated through the omnibus tests for model 
coefficients and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test. Despite the fact the omnibus tests for 
model coefficients returned highly significant results (p < .001) for the interpersonal 
skills cross-cultural competence factor, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test just missed the 
mark to be considered significant (p = 0.49 where > 0.50 is considered significant). The 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test indicates the interpersonal skill model is not as robust as the 
10 other models.  
Across all the 11 models, the ranges of predictability for the variability in a 
particular cross-cultural competence factor, as projected by the Cox and Snell and 
Nagerlkerke R squares, range from 20.1%-26.9% for relationship orientation to 52.7%-
79.8% for self-efficacy. The analysis shows the findings in this study are statistically 
significant.  
Cognitive Style Findings Summary  
The most noteworthy finding is that need for cognition is strongly correlated to 
every cross-cultural competence factor. Need for cognition indicates enjoyment and a 





cognitive tasks as a challenge rather than a stressful event. Often, interacting with foreign 
partners is a challenging cognitive and emotional task.  
SEALs’ need for cognition was higher than university students, close to Canadian 
forces senior enlisted, and lagged well behind Canadian forces officers, two sample 
populations from Thompson’s (1998) study. Unlike almost all of the cross-cultural 
competence factors, and the cognition style personal fear of invalidity that had fairly even 
distribution between superior assessment scorers and substandard assessment scorers, 
SEALs in this study were skewed toward superior performance by more than 82% (72 
superior; 20 substandard assessment scorers) in need for cognition. This strong need for 
cognition by SEALs in this study is consistent with the USSOCOM’s (2019) 
characterization that the typical U.S. SOF member “enjoys games which require problem 
solving like chess” (p. 58). Additionally, the mean of newly minted SEALs is 
significantly better than the mean of experienced SEALs in personal need for structure, 
and newly minted SEALs mean score in need for cognition is very close to experienced 
SEAL superior assessment scorers.  
Personal fear of validity had negative correlations to five cross-cultural 
competence factors: cultural acuity, cultural relativism, interpersonal skills, stress 
resilience, and self-efficacy. These results make sense on face value; lack of confidence 
in one’s own judgment, concern over making errors, and slowness in decision making 
could negatively impact all of the traits where the data shows a negative correlation. The 
good news for SEALs is that the mean for personal fear of validity was very low, and the 
top 15th percentile registered the lowest possible score; the bottom 15th percentile was 





Rigidity was negatively correlated to cultural relativism but had a positive 
correlation with suspending judgment and self-efficacy. This is the most perplexing 
finding. Generally, with all things being equal and barring the extremes, one would 
assume the lower the score on rigidity the better. The data show the expected negative 
correlation holds for cultural relativism—an ability to recognize and accept difference 
and the corresponding alternative approaches and responses that different cultures 
require. High rigidity, logically, would get in the way of cultural relativism. However, 
why would higher rigidity correlate to increased performance in suspending judgment 
and self-efficacy? One explanation may be that suspending judgment and self-efficacy 
are positively affected by the confidence and commitment to maintain a dogged 
persistence even in the face of mounting evidence that a change in response is required. 
The SEAL mean for rigidity was low (significantly lower than the comparison group 
from Thompson’s [1998] study) and SEALs also were skewed toward the bottom 15th in 
suspending judgment (65 dogs compared to 30 stars; newly minted SEALs accounted for 
the majority of this skewing). However, this straightforward explanation does not hold 
for self-efficacy where SEALs were skewed toward top assessment scorers in self-
efficacy (70 stars and 21 dogs; newly minted SEALs were largely responsible for this 
result as well). Furthermore, the data showed rigidity had a very high odds ratio; for 
every single point increase in rigidity, self-efficacy was 600 times more likely to increase 
by one point. Further study is required to get beyond a surface explanation of this result.  
Personal need for structure was only correlated to cultural relativism and it had a 
positive correlation. This is another unexpected finding. Because personal need for 





al., 2009) has indicated integrative complexity may have a role in cross-cultural 
competence, I expected to see personal need for structure to be negatively correlated with 
cultural relativism; but the correlation was positive. I also expected it to have a larger role 
across the cross-cultural competence factors, and this was not the case. This finding may 
indicate structure is important in recognizing and accepting cultural differences and 
pursuing alternative approaches and responses appropriate for specific cultures.  
Demographic-Related Findings Summary 
Demographic data were captured to assess any potential correlation to cross-
cultural competence factors. With only two exceptions in one of 11 cross-cultural 
competence factors, demographic data were not found to correlate to any of the factors in 
cognition styles or any other cross-cultural competence factor. For cross-cultural 
competence factor of suspending judgment, being an experienced SEAL was negatively 
correlated with the factor and being an officer positively correlated. The data showed 
being a newly minted SEAL would be 43.5 times more likely to increase a point in 
suspending judgment. This is somewhat surprising when looking at the distribution of 
dogs and stars in suspending judgment where newly minted SEALs were heavily skewed 
toward dogs (51 dogs, 17 all-stars) in suspending judgment. Nevertheless, the data 
showed being a newly minted SEAL increased the likelihood of higher suspending 
judgment scores, which is another argument for why newly minted SEALs should be 
considered for missions that engage foreign partners.  
Being an officer would be 6.3 times more likely to increase a point in suspending 
judgment. While being an officer was positively correlated to suspending judgment when 





and enlisted, across all C3 factors showed little difference (see Figure 4.22). For 
suspending judgment, specifically, the officer mean (4.23) was lower than the enlisted 
mean (4.40). My takeaway from these data is that when building a team to maximize for 
cross-cultural competence, do not play the averages—know who the stars are through 








The purpose of this quantitative study was to identify personal traits correlated 
with cross-cultural competence assessment factors and to potentially aid in the selection, 
training, and assignment of SOF related to cross-cultural competence. This research was 
about cross-cultural competence factors at an individual level of analysis. I am aware of 
no other study that assesses a cognition style model for correlation with cross-cultural 
competence. I discovered a correlation between cognition style factors and, to a lesser 
degree, demographic traits and scores assessing individual cross-cultural competence 
factors.  
In this chapter, I present the limitations of this study, review the objectives of the 
study, review the research questions and provide a brief overview of the answers to these 
questions, and then present findings and implications of the study. The chapter closes 
with recommendations for further study.  
Limitations of the Study 
 It is important to keep the limitations of the study in mind as I discuss the key 
findings, their possible implications, and potential future research avenues. The 
theoretical and functional foundation of this study is constrained by limitations of the 
models and assessments that measure cross-cultural competence. Despite significant 
DOD focus and academic effort, the foundation is suggestive but not definitive.  
Gabrenya, Griffith, et al. (2012) provided an overview of the shortfalls of existing 
cross-cultural competence models, including (a) imprecise definition constructs, with no 





key model components such as antecedents; knowledge, skills, abilities and other 
attributes; and performance outcomes; (c) imprecision in specifying the causal order 
among constructs; and (d) poor articulation of competencies with respect to the U.S. 
military’s practical selection needs due to insufficient attention to military occupational 
specialty (specific jobs/functions), rank, and service variables. These shortcomings limit 
the predictive and explanatory abilities of existing cross-cultural competence models and 
consequently limit the predictive abilities and training and development applications of 
existing 3C assessments.  
The latest cross-cultural competence models for a military context are a 
combination of compositional and developmental frameworks. Spitzberg and Changnon 
(2009) examined the existing compositional models in 2009, but their assessment applied 
to all of the models to date:  
They are theoretically weak . . . in their ability to specify conditional 
relationships among the components. They are also theoretically weak in 
leaving fundamentally undefined the precise criteria by which competency 
is defined. It is generally not clear, in other words, what constituted 
competency in these models—what levels of proficiency, what specific 
combination of criteria or outcomes, would be determinative of competence. 
(p. 15) 
 
Spitzburg and Changnon (2009) continued with a critique of existing developmental 
models: 
Developmental models . . . [are] correspondingly weak in specifying the 
interpersonal and intercultural competence traits that facilitate or moderate the 
course of such evolution [developmental progress]. (p. 24) 
 
The limitations of this study are tied to the weaknesses of cross-cultural 
competence assessments (Gabrenya, Moukarzel, Poermance, Griffith, & Deaton, 2012; 





sometimes equated with a set of knowledge, skills, abilities, and other attributes and, at 
other times, discussed as a subjective evaluative impression of a level of performance 
(Abbe & Bortnick, 2010; Turnley 2011). Selmeski (2007) argued observable and 
measurable standards are “poorly applied to culture; too often applied to surface level 
behavior but ignores the middle and deep-levels of culture” (p. 6).  
Another limitation of this study and the assessment of cross-cultural competence 
is the use of self-referent tools. Gabrenya, Griffith, et al. (2012) question the 
methodology of self-reporting: “Self-reports of cross-cultural skills and abilities have 
been criticized on methodological grounds and may have questionable validity” (p. 7). 
While the assessments in this study were shown to have acceptable validity in a few 
studies, they have not been robustly examined. Regardless, no viable alternative existed 
for assessing cross-cultural competence. Comprehensive and informed peer assessments 
or expert measurements did not exist and could have involved significant amounts of 
time, effort, and potential intrusion upon or disruption of military operations.  
Furthermore, subjective evaluations of performance are context specific. 
This importance of context was underscored by SEAL peer assessments from this 
study where the same individuals received nominations as both superior and 
substandard-assessment scorers from peers. Shifting contexts can undermine 
attempts to establish standards and measures of cross-cultural competence 
(Spitzberg, 2000, 2007; Spitzberg & Cupach, 1984, 2002). One skill or behavior 
may be assessed as competent in one context but not another, “thus no particular 
skill is likely to ever be universally competent” (Spitzberg & Changon, 2009, p. 6). 





between partner forces and/or mission success enabled by cross-cultural 
competence—may be possible with significant focus and effort, but identifying 
what contributed to that success and developing training and education so others 
can achieve success is a challenge that has not been solved.  
Crossing cultures is adaptive work, not a technical task. Therefore, tools, 
approaches and standards vary by circumstance. In this research, I used the 
definition of competence Abbe and Bortnick (2010) presented: “a set of behaviors 
that describe excellent performance” (p. 14), where that set of behaviors requires 
knowledge, supporting skills and abilities, and complementary personality traits. 
However, it is exceedingly difficult to measure competence—those contributing 
behaviors and their antecedents—in crossing cultures. 
Despite these limitations, I used what was available to view cross-cultural 
competence from a lens of personal traits, demographics, and cognition styles. 
Shaffer, Harrison, Gregersen, Black, and Ferzandi (2006) underscored why this 
might be fruitful: “When individuals are operating in these ambiguous situations 
[with many unknowns regarding the norms of behavior, social roles, and 
expectations], personality may be the dominant factor that guides individual 
behavior” (as cited in Abbe et al., 2007, p. 4). While I believe the findings of this 
study are significant, they are limited by the state of the field, which remains 
lacking. 
This study is also limited by the population of experienced SEALs and 
overall population of SEALs. The sample size of recent SEAL training graduates 





experienced SEALs was only 15% of the target population available to participate 
in the study (89 of 588). Furthermore, the total sample size of 253, composed of 
newly minted SEALs and experienced SEALs, is a small fraction of the SEAL 
community (253 of 3394 or 7.5%). Given these limitations, the results of this study 
are suggestive but far from conclusive. 
Study Objectives 
The goal of this research was to inform and potentially improve effectiveness of 
U.S Navy SEAL and other SOF cross-cultural-related selection, training, education and 
development, and personnel assignment. I identified personal traits among SEALs 
correlated with superior or lagging performance in cross-cultural environments. I 
answered the two primary research questions by identifying baseline attribute profiles of 
recent graduates from SEAL selection and benchmark objectives of SEAL cross-cultural-
related factors, the top 15th percentile of cross-cultural competence factors. These 
findings inform potential adjustments to selection, training, education and development, 
and personnel assignment related to cross-cultural competence.  
Research Questions and Short Answers 
Research Question 1 was: Focusing on experienced SEALs, what are the attribute 
profiles, defined by cohort mean scores, of cross-cultural superior and substandard 
assessment scorers, and what is the relationship between demographic and cognition style 
factors and individual scores in a cross-cultural competence? There are statistically 
significant correlations among the 11 factors associated with cross-cultural competence 





shown in Figure 5.1, superior assessment scorers (all-stars) scored very near or in the top 
ring—a score between 5 and the maximum 6, in all cross-cultural competence factors.  
 
Figure 5.1. Cross-cultural competence factors mean comparison star vs. dogs. 
 
Substandard assessment scorers (dogs) scored between the third and fourth ring 
out of a possible six. The pattern of scores—relationships of means to other factors—
appears to be consistent between all-stars and dogs. That is, the attribute profiles of all-
stars and dogs are roughly the same. Overall, based on the attribute profiles of superior 
and substandard assessment scorers, it appears that SEALs have registered a strong cross-
cultural competence baseline for the community. 
The most significant difference between superior and substandard assessment 
scorers in cognitive styles was the large variance in need for cognition (correlated to all 
11 cross-cultural competence factors) and personal need for structure (correlated to only 
one cross-cultural competence factor; see Figure 5.2). This difference is what appears to 
separate all-stars and dogs the most and, given the importance of need for cognition, 
likely contributes to some of the variance in the cross-cultural competence means of all-































from Thompson’s (1998) study in personal need for structure, rigidity, and personal fear 
of invalidity. For need for cognition, SEALs were very close to Canadian armed forces 
noncommissioned officers (0.06 points less) and were not far behind Canadian armed 
forces officers (0.23 points less). The mean scores for the entire SEAL population in the 
study presented a very strong cognitive style attribute profile from a cross-cultural 
competence perspective. 
 
Figure 5.2. Decision style factors mean comparison stars vs. dogs. 
 
Research Question 2 was: Focusing on recent SEAL selection course graduates, 
what is the attribute profile, as defined by mean cohort scores, for SEAL selection 
graduates, and how does this profile compare with the profile of an experienced SEAL 
cross-cultural high performer? For cross-cultural competence, newly minted SEALs 
faired very well in comparison to the top assessment scorers, with a mean difference in 
cross-cultural competence mean scores of 0.75 points and strong mean scores for self-
efficacy, cultural acuity, cultural interest, and stress resilience (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4). 






















assessment scorers in mean scores for need for cognition, the most important cognitive 
factor for cross-cultural competence.  
 

























































Major Findings and Potential Implications 
The two most noteworthy findings are (a) need for cognition was strongly 
correlated to every cross-cultural competence factor and (b) newly minted SEALs may 
have a strong predisposition for contributing in a cross-cultural mission set.  
Need for cognition is highly correlated to cross-cultural performance, and SEALs 
scored high in need for cognition. Need for cognition was correlated to eight of 11 cross-
cultural competence factors with a significance level of less than .001. Statistically, there 
is near-zero risk of concluding that need for cognition had no correlation to these eight 
factors. For the other three of the 11 cross-cultural competence factors, need for cognition 
had a significance level of 0.01, 0.03, and 0.04, meaning that there is a 1-4% risk of 
concluding that need for cognition showed a correlation when it does not.  
The SEALs displayed high but not extraordinarily high means in need for 
cognition. As discussed previously, when comparing SEALs’ scores in need for cognition 
to the sample populations from Thompson’s (1998) study, SEALs were higher in need for 
cognition than university students, close to Canadian forces senior enlisted, and lagged 
slightly behind Canadian forces officers. The SEALs in this study were skewed toward 
top assessment scorers in need for cognition. Unlike almost all cross-cultural competence 
factors and the cognition style personal fear of invalidity that had fairly even distribution 
between superior assessment scorers and substandard assessment scorers, SEALs in this 
study were skewed toward superior performance by more than 82% (72 superior; 20 
substandard assessment scorers) in need for cognition. SEALs may be well positioned to 
use an apparent community strength in high need for cognition for positive performance 





In cognition style factors, newly minted SEALs’ mean scores were very close to 
top assessment scorers in need for cognition. Again, this was the most critical cognition 
style factor, with strong correlation to all the cross-cultural competence factors. 
Additionally, newly minted SEAL means were close to all-star assessment scorers in 
personal need for structure and rigidity.  
There was a major difference in personal fear of invalidity between newly minted 
SEALs and all-stars. Experienced SEALs in the top 15th percentile registered the lowest 
possible score for personal fear of invalidity, which may raise concerns about hubris and 
overconfidence in those who scored zero fear of invalidity; newly minted SEAL mean 
scores were in the middle of the scale. In summary, the newly minted SEAL means 
across cognition style factors presented cross-cultural competence.  
Newly minted SEALs showed strengths in five of 11 cross-cultural competence 
factors. Identified by a disproportionate number of all-stars—a greater than 60% skew 
toward stars and away from dogs—these newly minted SEAL stand out cross-cultural 
competence factors include the following: interpersonal skills, cultural interest, 
inquisitiveness, stress resilience, and self-efficacy. This may indicate that newly minted 
SEALs, especially those with high scores in need for cognition, may be better positioned 
than the average experienced SEAL to perform well when engaging with foreign 
partners.  
Overall, the newly minted SEAL attribute profile—means in both cognitive style 
and cross-cultural competence factors—may imply newly minted SEALs may be better 
postured to engage foreign partners than the average experienced SEAL or may at least 





in need for cognition, the only cognition styles factor the correlated across all 11 cross-
cultural competence factors, bodes well for integrating newly minted SEALs into partner-
nation engagements. For mission selection, if numbers matter and the task element must 
be culled, all things being equal, experienced SEALS are chosen over new SEALs. 
However, in partner force engagement, these data imply all things may not be equal, and 
newly minted SEALs may bring something special to the table. 
The mean scores for SEALs in this study and populations in Thompson’s (1998) 
study of cognition styles are shown in Figure 5.5 in a radar chart. The same information 
in tabular form is shown in Table 5.1. These comparisons provides a reference point for 
where SEALs fit compared to other populations.  
 




























Population Means for Decision Style Factors 
 
  
Across the three factors where a lower score is generally better—personal need 
for structure, rigidity, and personal fear of invalidity—SEALs scored significantly lower 
than Canadian military officers and noncommissioned officers (senior enlisted), and 
University of Arizona students. However, in need for cognition, where a higher score is 
better, SEALs lag behind Canadian military personnel from Thompson’s (1998) study.  
Other Findings and Implications 
In addition to the correlation of need for cognition to every cross-cultural 
competence factor, and the possible high contribution potential of newly minted SEALs 
to cross-cultural competence missions, several other findings are worth noting. These 
include SEALs’ scores in personal fear of invalidity, cultural relativism and the need for 
structure, newly minted SEALs’ potential weaknesses in suspending judgment, 
inclusiveness limitations of SEALs, perplexing findings on rigidity, and implications for 
assessment and selection—for SEALs in general and for cross-cultural competence 
missions specifically. Each of these findings will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
The SEALs were nearly fearless regarding personal fear invalidity. Personal fear 































245 Canadian NCOs 3.97 5.48 3.87 3.08 
245 Canadian Officers 3.58 5.65 3.62 3.11 





acuity, cultural relativism, interpersonal skills, stress resilience, and self-efficacy. The 
good news for SEALs is the mean for personal fear of validity was very low; those in the 
top 15th percentile registered the lowest possible score, while the bottom 15th percentile 
was not far behind. On the other hand, extreme low scores in personal fear of invalidity 
may raise concerns about hubris and overconfidence, issues not unfamiliar to the SEAL 
community. 
The personal need for structure was only correlated to cultural relativism, which 
an unexpected finding. Because personal need for structure was negatively correlated 
with integrative complexity, and research (Tadmore et al., 2009) has indicated integrative 
complexity may have a role in cross-cultural competence, I expected to see personal need 
for structure have a negative correlation. I also expected it to have a larger role across the 
cross-cultural competence factors. This was not the case. This finding may indicate 
structure is important in recognizing and accepting cultural differences and pursuing 
alternative approaches and responses appropriate for specific cultures. In the literature, I 
found no indications of tools or structured processes to consider and improve cultural 
relativism—the ability to recognize and accept cultural differences and the corresponding 
alternative approaches and responses different cultures engender. Providing structure and 
developing tools and training to recognize cultural differences is one potential path to 
improve cross-cultural competence. 
Newly minted SEAL dogs were prominent (75% skew toward dogs) in 
suspending judgment—the ability to withhold judgment until adequate information 
becomes available and to perceive information neutrally. This result may warrant further 





The SEALS were low in inclusiveness. Newly minted SEALs (55.9%) and 
experienced SEALs (63.6%) were skewed toward low scores in inclusiveness. Defined as 
a tendency to accept and include people and things based on commonalities and an 
appreciation of differences, inclusiveness is important not only in cross-cultural 
competence but also with integration of SEAL support and enablers (non-SEALs) into 
SEAL elements. Based on my experience and discussions with other SEALs, integration 
of non-SEALs into SEAL formations has been difficult at times. An increased focus on 
inclusiveness training and awareness may be warranted for the entire SEAL community.  
There were perplexing findings about rigidity. Rigidity was negatively correlated 
with cultural relativism but has a positive correlation to suspending judgment and self-
efficacy. I found this to be the most perplexing finding. Generally, with all things being 
equal and barring the extremes, the lower the score on rigidity, the better. The data show 
pattern holds for cultural relativism—an ability to recognize and accept difference and 
the corresponding alternative approaches and responses that different cultures require. 
High rigidity, logically, would get in the way of cultural relativism. However, higher 
rigidity correlated to increased performance in suspending judgment and self-efficacy. 
One explanation may be suspending judgment and self-efficacy are positively affected by 
the confidence and commitment to maintain a dogged persistence even in the face of 
mounting evidence that a change is response is required.  
The SEAL mean for rigidity was low (significantly lower than the comparison 
group from Thompson’s [1998] study), and SEALs also were skewed toward the bottom 
15th percentile in suspending judgment (65 dogs compared to 30 all-stars; newly minted 





hold for self-efficacy, where SEALs were skewed toward top assessment scorers (70 all-
stars and 21 dogs; newly minted SEALs were largely responsible for this result as well). 
Furthermore, data showed rigidity had a very high odds ratio. For every single point 
increase in rigidity, self-efficacy was 600 times more likely to increase by one point. 
Further study is required to get beyond a surface explanation of this result.  
My takeaway from all of the findings is that when specifically building a team to 
maximize for cross-cultural competence, one should not play the averages and should 
instead know who the all-stars are through assessment. I would not go as far as to say 
need for cognition, other cognition style factors, or cross-cultural competence factors 
should influence SEAL selection. The U.S. SOF, including SEALs, are considered 
warrior-diplomats. The diplomat role is related to cross-cultural competence. As this 
research has shown, cross-cultural competence is vitally important to SOF operations and 
U.S. national security. Especially for SEALs, the warrior role is paramount; direct action 
raids, violence of action, and speed of execution are key to the warrior role, and it is not 
clear what role cognition styles and cross-cultural competence factors play in warrior 
competence.  
The Navy Health Research Center studied top assessment scorers in SEAL close-
quarter combat training with a focus on the biometric output (e.g., heart rate, breathing 
rate; K. Kelly, personal communication, 2012). Before considering tinkering with 
selection criteria, it would be important to understand how cognition styles and cross-
cultural competence factors are correlated to superior performance in close combat. 
However, as noted previously, those with high need for cognition and newly minted 





competence. The insights into cross-cultural superior-performer attributes identified in 
this study may assist with improving personnel assignments to positions requiring high 
cross-cultural capability. These results may be the start of a method for cross-cultural-
related personnel screening and could assist with related personnel assignments. 
 The results provided minimal insight into assisting with the design of SOF 
training and education focused on cross-cultural capabilities and the measurement of 
related program effectiveness. This is consistent with the state of cross-cultural models 
and assessment tools.  
Potential Future Research 
As discussed previously, the correlation of SEAL top assessment scorers in close 
combat training (identified as “top guns”) and superior performers on direct action 
missions should be studied to understand how these top guns compare with cross-cultural 
competence all-stars in cognition style and cross-cultural competence factors. Is there a 
cognition style difference between a close combat top gun and a cross-cultural 
competence all-star? If not, the factors that contribute to both could become assessment 
and selection aids for the SEAL selection course. If there are differences, these 
differences should be factored into building mission specific task elements.  
While this study was focused on Navy SEALs, it would be informative to conduct 
a similar study with the Special Forces community, commonly known as Green Berets. 
Do top assessment scorers in the Green Beret selection exercise, an event known as 
Robin Sage, a cross-cultural simulation, display a high need for cognition, and do other 





substandard assessment scorers? How do recent graduates of the Special Forces 
qualification course compare to experienced Green Berets?  
The correlation of rigidity to three cross-cultural competence factors may also 
present the potential for a fruitful study. Why is rigidity negatively correlated to cultural 
relativism and positively correlated to suspending judgment and self-efficacy? 
This study was, in part, inspired by my interest in the importance of integrative 
complexity—the capacity and willingness to differentiate among competing perspectives 
and to integrate conceptual links among these competing perspectives (Seudfeld et al., 
1992). Tadmore et al. (2009) placed integrative complexity into the context of cross-
cultural competence: 
Within a cross-cultural context, integrative complexity reflects the degree to 
which people accept the reasonableness of clashing cultural perspectives on how 
to live and, consequently, the degree to which they are motivated to develop 
cognitive schemas that integrate these competing world views by explaining how 
different people can come to such divergent conclusions or by specifying ways of 
blending potentially discordant norms and values. (p. 106) 
 
 Cognition styles, and particularly personal need for structure and need for 
cognition, were used as proxies for integrative complexity. A study that finds an elegant 
and minimally intrusive way to assess the impact of integrate complexity may yield 
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CROSS-CULTURAL COMPETENCE SELF-ASSESSMENT 
 
1. I would have trouble predicting the long-term effects of my actions in a new 
country. 
2. I would easily change my outward appearance based on the mission, such as 
switching from a military to a humanitarian effort. 
3. On a deployment, I would be good at “working with locals” to give me the needed 
intelligence. 
4. The views and beliefs of American culture are generally superior to those of the 
countries we visit. 
5. My personality is such that most people are quickly drawn to me. 
6. I often have trouble envisioning the long-term effects of my actions. 
7. I am good at getting others to see my point of view. 
8. I do better sticking with an approach until it works versus changing tactics. 
9. I would befriend locals during deployments to support mission success. 
10. I often have to rely on others to adjust my perceptions of what is really going on 
in a group or setting. 
11. As an American, I probably do not have as many biases as do people from Middle 
Eastern cultures. 
12. Without the help of fellow teammates, I would struggle in figuring out what the 
locals are really up to in deployment situations. 
13. I would quickly get used to unfamiliar customs if deployed. 
14. I devote significant time to building many lasting relationships in my life. 
15. I often “feel the pain” of others when someone is sharing a sad story. 
16. If I knew I was being deployed, I would spend some free time learning about the 
cultural customs before I left. 
17. I would easily and believably “fake compassion” with foreign citizens to achieve 
the mission. 
18. I find the thought of negotiating with village elders unpleasant. 
19. My own sense of humor would come in handing during deployments to put 
foreign locals at ease. 
20. Deployed U.S. forces need to focus less on compassion and more on “getting the 
job done” when dealing with locals. 
21. I would find it easy to be casual and friendly with foreign citizens during 
deployments. 
22. When watching two people have a discussion, I can pick up on and differences 
between what is being said and what is really felt. 
23. I enjoy making sense of complex situations. 
24. Interacting with locals in order to build relationships during deployments would 
be worth the risks. 





26. My personality is such that, in a foreign country, I could quickly put an irate 
citizen at easy. 
27. I possess the skills needed to persuade foreign civilians to provide sensitive 
information.  
28. I consider myself as being oblivious to what is really going on in group 
interactions. 
29. I would have little problem figuring out the heart of the matter when observing a 
disagreement between soldiers and foreign citizens. 
30. It is easy for me to quickly gain the trust of others through casual discussion. 
31. If I find a common practice of the locals offensive while deployed, I would have 
trouble understanding why the locals act that way. 
32. Prior to deployment, I would try to learn the basics of the language before going, 
whether directed to or not. 
33. Since we are often deployed in order to help other countries, these countries 
should adjust to our customs, not the other way around.  
34. I can win over a group of strangers with ease. 
35. I would probably rely on another team member to strike up initial conversations 
with foreign citizens when deployed, as this is not my strong suit. 
36. I could see my temper getting the best of me when interacting with unappreciative 
foreign citizens during deployment. 
37. I am a compassionate and trusting person in general. 
38. It would be hard for me to read the intent of foreign citizens with whom I am 
communicating. 
39. I use my sense of humor to quickly put others at ease. 
40. If a trainee was resistant to my instructions, I would put myself in their shoes to 
figure out why. 
41. In trying to persuade a village elder to let us search his village, I would probably 
fall back on force if my first attempts at persuasion did not work. 
42. If you know the basic do’s and don’ts of a country, and some language, that’s all 
you need to get by to interact with locals during deployments. 
43. Negotiating with village elders during a deployment would fit my abilities. 
44. I get upset when I hear people making fun of people from other countries. 
 
On a scale of 1 to 6: 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Moderately Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Slightly Agree 
5 – Moderately Agree 
6 – Strongly Agree 
 
Inquisitiveness 
1. I enjoy getting to know people. 
2. I enjoy meeting new people and learning about their life. 
3. Getting to know new people is fascinating to me. 





5. I enjoy learning how others’ think. 
 
Suspending Judgment 
1. I would rather wait on additional information than make a quick decision. 
2. I prefer to make a decision only after I review available information. 
3. I collect all information possible on an issue before I make a decision. 
4. I take as much time as needed to make a decision. 
5. I like to feel certain that I have considered all available information before I make 
a decision.  
 
Optimism 
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best. 
2. If something can go wrong for me, it will. 
3. I’m always optimistic about my future. 
4. I hardly ever expect things to go my way. 
5. I rarely count on good things happening to me. 
6. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad. 
 
Stress Resilience 
1. I tend to bounce back quickly after hard times. 
2. I have a hard time making it through stressful events. 
3. It does not take me long to recover from stressful events. 
4. It is hard for me to snap back when something bad happens. 
5. I usually come through difficult times with little trouble. 
6. I tend to take a long time to get over set-backs in my life. 
 
Inclusiveness 
1. I enjoy events where I can meet people from a variety of backgrounds. 
2. Learning about the different cultures of the world intrigues me. 
3. Understanding how a person is different from me greatly enhances our 
relationship. 
4. I enjoy learning about the traditions of other cultures. 
5. I would like to go to events that feature activities from other countries. 
6. I gain insight from other people’s experiences. 
7. I feel comfortable talking with individuals of a different race.  
 
On a 1 to 5 scale 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Disagree 
3 – Neither Agree nor Disagree  
4 – Agree 
5 – Strongly Disagree  
 
Self-efficacy.  
1. I am sure I would be able to handle all of the stress of adjusting to a culture that is 





2. I am confident that I can get used to the unusual conditions of living in another 
culture. 
3. I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough. 
4. It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals. 
5. I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events. 
6. I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping 
abilities. 
7. No matter what comes my way, I’m usually able to handle it. 
 
On a scale of 1 to 6: 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Moderately Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Slightly Agree 
5 – Moderately Agree 
6 – Strongly Agree 
 
Lie Scale. A score greater than 15 results in removal of a participant. 
1. I have never been late for an appointment. 
2. I have never known someone I did not like. 
3. I believe that one should never engage in leisure activities. 
4. I feel that there is no such things as an honest mistake. 
5. I have never hurt another person’s feelings.  
 
On a scale of 1 to 6: 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Moderately Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Slightly Agree 
5 – Moderately Agree 








COGNITIVE STYLE SELF-ASSESSMENT 
 
Personal Need for Structure 
1. It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it. 
2. I’m not bothered by things that upset my daily routine. 
3. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
4. I like a place for everything and everything in its place. 
5. I like being spontaneous. 
6. I find that a well ordered life with regular hours makes my life tedious. 
7. I don’t like situations that are uncertain. 
8. I hate to change my plans at the last minute. 
9. I hate to be with people that are unpredictable. 
10. I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
11. I enjoy the exhilaration of being put in unpredictable situations. 
12. I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear. 
  
On a scale of 1 to 6: 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Moderately Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Slightly Agree 
5 – Moderately Agree 
6 – Strongly Agree 
 
Personal Fear of Invalidity 
1. I may struggle with a few decisions but not very often. 
2. I never put off making important decisions. 
3. Sometimes I become impatient over my indecisiveness. 
4. Sometimes I see so many options to a situations that it is really confusing. 
5. I can be reluctant to commit myself to something because of the possibility that I 
might be wrong. 
6. I tend to struggle with most decisions. 
7. Even after making an important decision I continue to think about the pros and 
cons to make sure I am not wrong. 
8. Regardless of whether others see an event as positive or negative I don’t mind 
committing myself to it. 
9. I prefer situations where I do not decide immediately. 
10. I rarely doubt that the course of action I have selected will be correct. 
11. I tend to continue to evaluate recently made decisions. 
12. I wish I did not worry so much about making errors. 
13. Decisions rarely weigh heavily on my shoulders. 
14. I find myself reluctant to commit to new ideas but find little comfort in remaining 






On a scale of 1 to 6: 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Moderately Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Slightly Agree 
5 – Moderately Agree 
6 – Strongly Agree 
 
Need for Cognition 
1. I prefer complex to simple problems. 
2. I would like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking. 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure 
to challenge my thinking abilities.  
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely the chance that I will 
have to think in depth about something.  
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
7. I only think as hard as I have to. 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to [rather than] long term ones. 
9. I like tasks that required little thought once I’ve learned them. 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions. 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much. 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
14. The note of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not required much thought. 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of 
mental effort.  
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it 
works. 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me 
personally. 
 
On a scale of 1 to 8 
1 – Very Strong Disagreement 
2 – Strong Disagreement 
3 – Moderate Disagreement 
4 – Slight Disagreement 
5 – Slight Agreement 
6 – Moderate Agreement 
7 – Strong Agreement 








1. I do not enjoy having to adapt myself to new and unusual situations. 
2. I prefer to stop and thing before I act on even trifling matters. 
3. I would not like the kind of work which involves a large number of different 
activities. 
4. I usually find that one way of attacking a problem is best, even though it doesn’t 
seem to work in the beginning. 
5. I dislike having to learn new ways of doing things. 
6. I am a methodical person in whatever I do. 
7. I am usually able to keep a job longer that most people. 
8. I think that it is usually wise to do things in a conventional way. 
9. I always finish the task I start even if they are not important. 
10. People who go about their work methodically are almost always successful. 
11. When I have undertaken a task, I find it difficult to set it aside, even for a short 
amount of time. 
12. I am very conscientious about things such as locking doors and turning off lights. 
13. I have done many things on the spur of the moment. 
14. It is important to be prompt about appointments and the like. 
15. I usually dislike to set aside a task that I have undertaken unit it is finished. 
16. I am inclined to go form one activity to another without continuing on any one for 
too long. 
17. I prefer to do things according to a routine which I plan myself. 
18. I like a great deal of variety in my work. 
19. An expert who doesn’t come up with a definite answer probably doesn’t know too 
much. 
20. It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a simple one. 
21. I would like to live in a foreign country for a while. 
22. Many of our most important decisions are based on insufficient information.  
 
On a scale of 1 to 6: 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Moderately Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Slightly Agree 
5 – Moderately Agree 















1. My age is:  
1 = 18-20 
2 = 20-24 
3 = 25-29 
4 = 30-35 
5 = 36-40 
6 = 40+ 
 
2. I am: 
 1 = male 
 2 = female 
 
3. I am a(n): 
 1 = Enlisted Member 
 2 = Warrant Officer 
 3 = Enlisted Member 
 
4. My page grade is (e.g., E4-9, O2-6) 
 1 = 1-3 
 2 = 4-5 
 3 = 6 
 4 = 7-8 
 5 = 9 
 
5. I am: 
 1 = active duty 
 2 = a reservist 
 
6. My time in service, in years, is: 
 1 = 0-4 
 2 = 5-8 
 3 = 9-12 
 4 = 13-16 
 5 = 16-20 
 6 = 20+ 
 
7. I have been deployed ___ times over the last FIVE years. 
 
8. Length of time of most recent deployment = _____ months 
 
9. During this deployment, my job required that I interact and/or form relations with local 





 1 = Not at all 
 2 = Very little 
 3 = A moderate amount 
 4 = A fair amount 
 5 = A great deal 
 6 = It was essential to my job 
 
10. Please estimate the number of hours of cultural awareness training (e.g., online, 
classroom, predeployment, excluding language training) that you have received from the 
military during your career: ____ HOURS. 
 
11. Please rate how effective you think the cultural awareness training was in preparing 
you for your assignment: 
 1 = Not at all 
 2 = Minimally effective 
 3 = Moderately effective 
 4 = Highly effective 
 5 = Very highly effective (essential) 
 
10. Please estimate the number of hours of language training that you have received from 
the military during your career: ____ HOURS. 
 
11. Please rate how effective you think the language training was in preparing you for 
your assignment: 
 1 = Not at all 
 2 = Minimally effective 
 3 = Moderately effective 
 4 = Highly effective 
 5 = Very highly effective (essential) 
 
12. Identify the mission of your platoon or task element 
 1 = Train, Advise, and Assist (e.g., JPAT, JAT, VSP) 
 2 = Contingency Response (e.g., CRE) 
 3 = Other (Please specify) 
 
13. If your mission was contingency response how many exercises, SMEEs, etc., did your 
task element participate in? 
 1 = 0 
 2 = 1-3 
 3 = 4+ 
 
14. Provide your personal combat indicator (First Initial, Last Initial, Last 4 SSN). This 
will be used to identify your responses to all related assessments.  
 
15. What was the size of your task element (# of SEALs).  





 2 = 7-10 (Squad) 
 3 = 11- 16 (Platoon (-) 
 4 = 16-21 (Platoon) 
 
16. Where were you assigned? 
 1 = SOUTHCOM 
 2 = AFRICOM 
 3 = PACOM 
 4 = AFG 
 5 = CENTCOM (not deployed to AFG) 
 6 = EUCOM (not deployed to AFG) 
 
 17. Rate your Task Element degree of cross-cultural interaction. 
1 = No contact with partners (unilateral operations)  
2 = Infrequent contact with partners  
3 = Moderate contact with partners  
4 = Daily contact with partners  














1. Culture Fundamentals. How effective are your teammates at demonstrating 
knowledge of culture fundamentals such as definitions of culture, values, beliefs, 
behaviors, and norms? 
 
Does not apply 
customs and 
courtesies 
outside of own 
culture 
Applies limited 
















characteristics that enable 
learning and adaptations 








      
 
2. Cultural Awareness. How effective are your teammates at demonstrating 
awareness of cross-cultural differences? 
 
Demonstrates no 
awareness of American 
or Navy culture and 
other cultures in regard 
to religion, ethnicity, 
sex, gender, social 



















of own biases and 
does not allow them 




















3. Culture Skills. How effective are your teammates at applying cross-cultural skills 








of other cultures 
Makes limited attempts at 
verbal and nonverbal 
communication with 
members of other cultures; 
has difficulty considering 
other's perspectives; has 
























      
 
4. Communication Skills. How effective are your teammates at communicating with 
members of other cultures? 
 
Does not communicate 
verbally or 
nonverbally with 
members of other 
cultures; does not 
develop relationships 
with members of other 
cultures 
Demonstrates limited 


















with members of 
other cultures by 
speaking, gesturing, 





















5. Cross-Cultural Operations. How effective are your teammates at integrating 
cultural considerations into developing and executing plans? 
 










executing plans but 










planning and cultural 
considerations to reduce 












      
 
6. Influence. How effective are your teammates at practicing negotiation, 
persuasion, and mediation in a cross-cultural setting? 
 






Makes limited attempts to 
negotiate with members of 
other cultures; demonstrates 
limited consideration of 
social and political positions 








seamless and efficient 
negotiation/mediation 
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